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Abstract
Integrated Architectures and Network Centric Warfare represent two central
concepts in DoD’s on-going transformation. The true power of integrated architectures
is brought to bear when they are combined with simulation to move beyond a static
representation and create an executable architecture. This architecture can then be used
to experiment with system configurations and parameter values to guide employment
decisions. This thesis applies the methodology of Dr. Alexander Levis, former Chief
Scientist of the Air Force, to the static architecture representing the Aerospace Operations
Center (AOC). Using Colored Petri Nets and other simulation tools, an executable
architecture for the AOC’s Air Tasking Order (ATO) production thread was developed.
These models were then used to compare the performance of a current, forward deployed
AOC configuration to three other potential configurations, which utilize a network centric
environment to deploy a portion of the AOC and provide reach-back capabilities to the
non-deployed units. Performance was measured by the amount of time required to execute
the ATO cycle under each configuration. Communication requirements were analyzed
for each configuration and stochastic delays were modeled for all transactions in which
requirements could not be met due to the physical configuration of the AOC elements.
All four configurations were found to exhibit statistically different behavior with regard to
ATO cycle time.
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EXECUTABLE ARCHITECTURES AND THEIR APPLICATION TO A
GEOGRAPHICALLY DISTRIBUTED AIR OPERATIONS CENTER

I. Introduction and Problem Statement
1.1

Introduction
The concept of “transformation” is perhaps the most transcendent idea within

today’s Department of Defense (DoD). Whether it is in strategic forecasting, acquisition,
or contingency operations, transformational concepts abound. Perhaps the grandest vision
centers on the concept of Network Centric Warfare (NCW). Enabled by cutting edge
technology, the high-bandwidth networks of the Global Information Grid, and visionary
command and control (C2) doctrine, NCW aims to move the very basis of warfighting
operations away from “platform-centered” thinking and toward a “capability-centered”
model. In doing so, proponents of NCW claim, the DoD will generate “increased combat
power by networking sensors, decision makers, and shooters to achieve shared awareness,
increased speed of command, higher tempo of operations, greater lethality, increased
survivability, and a degree of self-synchronization.” [13, 2].
NCW is a far-reaching concept with implications for virtually every facet of DoD
operations. One of the most obvious potential applications of an information-enabled
force is the ability to conduct distributed operations. As the saying goes, “it is cheaper
to move electrons than people.” This concept pre-dates the formal notion of NCW and
has been experimented with extensively both within the DoD and in private enterprise.
It has even given rise to the terms “virtual organizations” and “virtual collaboration.”
A virtual organization exists only as long as necessary to complete a particular task.
Once completed, the organization can be disbanded and its resources freed to work on
other tasks. While in existence, the virtual organization’s members can collaborate in a
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virtual workspace utilizing networking to make their physical location far less important.
This allows leadership to assign the most applicable assets to the most important tasks,
regardless of physical location. [13, 20,39]
The United States Air Force (USAF) is uniquely positioned to take advantage
of early advancements in the realization of the NCW concept. The ability of aircraft
to operate largely without regard to physical terrain and to move within a theater of
operation at a high rate of speed allows them to rapidly exploit information advantages.
Given the degree of air superiority, if not air supremacy, which USAF assets often enjoy
in today’s operations, information about enemy forces is perhaps the most important
element to a successful air campaign.

Indeed, recent experiences in Afghanistan,

where bombers delivered precision-guided ordinance on coordinates provided by Army
personnel equipped with laptop computers in time frames measured in tens of minutes,
have highlighted the high degree of effectiveness that can be obtained. Effects that once
required massive firepower are now achieved through rapid maneuver and precision, each
enabled by information. [9, 19]
Enhanced battlespace awareness, the same “shared awareness” which NCW aims
to create, is a force multiplier at all levels. Even greater potential lies in moving this
revolution up the chain of command from the tactical engagement level to more strategic
decision making layers. The concepts of virtual organizations and virtual collaboration
lend themselves directly to the USAF’s time-tested principle of “centralized control, decentralized execution.” A geographically dispersed virtual organization charged with C2
efforts is perhaps the ultimate example of decentralized execution. While maintaining the
tenet of centralized control, this concept offers leadership the potential for a more tailored
organization which can be put in place more rapidly and at decreased cost.
The idea of an Air Operations Center (AOC) structured in this manner is not new.
The first known exercise of the concept came during a UNIFIED ENDEAVOR exercise
held in 1995, and it has been similarly tried in BLUE FLAG C2 exercises. [16, 20]
Proponents argued that the so-called “Split AOC” would offer a reduced forward footprint,
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which would translate to more rapid, lest costly deployment. Further, it was argued that
by reducing the forward footprint, fewer personnel would be exposed to force-protection
risks and the risk of a single successful attack crippling C2 operations would be reduced.
These efforts met with mixed results, with most criticisms centering on the lack
of robust communications and interoperable C2 systems. Indeed there was evidence that
the increased requirements for communications equipment and bandwidth, some of which
had to be commercially rented, actually made the Split AOC more costly. [16, 25] This
is reflective of the stove-piped nature of the forces that existed at the time. These are
exactly the issues that NCW aims to overcome. By making networked communications
and interoperability characteristics of daily operations and not special requirements to be
stood up for a particular occasion, this cost element should be reduced if not eliminated.
Even if these technical obstacles are overcome, the question of the effectiveness of
the Split AOC remains. On the one hand, there is evidence from previous exercises that
the products of such a configuration are less than optimal. This is not surprising given the
difficulties outlined above which these efforts have encountered; however, the elimination
of these difficulties would not likely lead to an equal degree of effectiveness. All Joint
and Service doctrine concerning the AOC assumes a single, unified command structure.
Take away the relatively simple technological limitations and you are still faced with this
cultural memory. The difficulties that remained, in the near term at least, would be the
inherent cost of the loss of face-to-face contact.
There is also the potential for degradation in effectiveness as a result of a loss of
synergy. Discussions with personnel who have operational experience in AOCs highlight
the numerous occasions in which a problem has been solved or even avoided because a
member of one division happened to overhear another division’s conversation, or noticed
a discrepancy on a display board in another cell. These chance encounters will not occur
if the divisions are geographically separated and communicate only via intentional virtual
collaboration. This introduces a further requirement for the operational employment of
a Split AOC, the need for documented, mature processes which ensure that these “lucky
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breaks” are not necessary. On the other hand, the potential also exists for the products of a
Split AOC to be not only comparable but even superior to those of a collocated, deployed
entity. If the data analysis assets that exist organically within the Continental United States
can be leveraged effectively to analyze and synthesize intelligence coming from multiple
sources throughout the theater, they may well be able to achieve superior results compared
to deployed analysis assets. Of course, a necessary first condition for this to take place is
an architecture which overcomes the aforementioned technical limitations.
Thus, the Split AOC concept faces two fundamental issues: First, can an architecture
be identified which overcomes the loss in product quality that can be expected without
face-to-face collaboration? And second, can such an architecture provide operational
benefits of sufficient magnitude to justify such a fundamental shift in how the USAF
accomplishes expeditionary C2?

1.2

Problem Formulation
1.2.1

General Problem.

Beginning with the premise that geographically

separating an AOC will impact both the timeliness and quality of the products developed,
a cost-benefit type analysis is required in order to fully address the merit of the idea. In
order to truly perform such an analysis for this shift in operations it is necessary that both
areas of impact be quantified through some objective measure. Arriving at such measures
requires three fundamental activities be performed:
1. Develop an architectural representation for the structure of both the collocated and
geographically distributed AOC functionality.
2. Generate executable models from this architecture for use in simulation analysis.
3. Define Measures of Effectiveness to be extracted from the data generated by the
execution of these models.
1.2.2

Scope and Assumptions.

An operational AOC is an extremely large

and complex organization, and to attempt to develop a single, monolithic model of its
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operations would be beyond the scope of this thesis. Accordingly, for the purposes of this
thesis, our scope will be reduced to the Air Tasking Order (ATO) development thread.
This is a major, although by no means the only, function of the AOC and will be described
in greater detail in Chapter 2.
Additionally, it is necessary to address some of the organizational issues of the AOC
at a higher degree of abstraction. As will be described later, the ATO production thread
is carried out by five divisions, each of which is comprised of a varying number of teams.
For the purposes of this thesis, the assumption is made that divisions act as single organizations, i.e. all teams within a division are collocated. It is recognized that this is an
artificial limitation, as there may well be an operational advantage to distributing not only
the divisions but the teams within the divisions as well. However, this creates an extremely
large number of potential configurations, and so for the purposes of this thesis we will
focus on modeling at the division level. Further research will likely focus on alternate
configurations for a Split AOC.
1.2.3

Thesis Goal.

As mentioned earlier, a cost-benefit analysis is a necessary

first step in evaluating the merit of the Split AOC concept. The benefit side of this analysis
will, in all likelihood, ultimately be monetized so that it can be expressed in terms of
dollars available for application elsewhere. It is not the intent of this thesis to arrive at
a measure for the benefit. Such an effort would be heavily dependent on the physical
architecture ultimately employed, as well as the complexities of contract vehicles and
opportunity costs. We will aim instead to quantify, to the greatest degree possible, the
time and quality impacts of employing the Split AOC versus the traditional collocated
AOC.
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II. Background
The foundation of this research is the interweaving of four seemingly unrelated subject
areas. These are the Air Operation Center (AOC), Communication Theory, Department
of Defense Architecture Framework (DoDAF), and Executable Architectures. The AOC
is the system of interest. Specifically, how does a geographically distributed AOC impact
effectiveness? In order to be able to make any assessments, Measures of Effectiveness
(MOEs) must be selected. The MOEs that have been selected stem from research done
in communication theory. DoDAF provides the capability to create a universal and
unambiguous description of the system. The DoDAF products are then used to create an
executable architecture which enables analysis of both the originating DoDAF products as
well as the system of interest. The necessary background information of these four subject
areas is provided within this chapter.

2.1

Air Operations Center
In order to be able to correctly architect and model an AOC, an in-depth discussion

of its operational procedures and organizational structure is required. According to the
Air Force Operational Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (AFOTTP) manual for Air
and Space Operations Center, ”The AOC is the operational-level command and control
(C2) center that provides the Commander of Air Force Forces with the capability to direct
and supervise the activities of assigned and attached forces and to monitor the actions of
both enemy and friendly forces” [1, 1-1]. This research effort will be concentrated on the
air tasking cycle which utilizes all available intelligence and guidance to produce the Air
Tasking Order (ATO) for all available air assets. The ATO development is a key thread
of overall AOC operations with direct implications of utilizing reachback capability for a
geographically distributed AOC.
2.1.1

AOC Operational Procedures.

The air tasking cycle and battle rhythm are

very closely related to AOC operational procedures. At a very high level of abstraction,
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the air tasking cycle is the process which utilizes Joint Force Commander (JFC) and Joint
Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) guidance in order to develop targets, allocates
assets, and finally produces an Air Tasking Order (ATO). To complete the cycle the ATO
must be executed and assessed. The assessment of the ATO will feed back into the cycle
by influencing the objectives, desired effects, and JFC and JFACC guidance. This cycle is
used to establish the battle rhythm. The battle rhythm is the timing and synchronization
that needs to occur throughout the air tasking cycle.
2.1.1.1

Air Tasking Cycle.

The air tasking cycle is a six step process

as shown in Figure 2.1. The first four steps of the process deal with developing the Air
Tasking Order and will be the focus of our study. The significant products of each step are
shown between the steps. The Air Tasking Cycle is accomplished through collaboration
between divisions, indicated by the organizational resources at the center of the figure.
The first step is to produce objectives, effects, and guidance. This planning phase
begins with the JFC sending a formal written letter to the JFACC. This letter describes
the next ATO’s priorities and apportionment for airpower missions. The strategy division,
with collaboration of Liaison Officers from the JFC staff, submits recommended guidance
and apportionment. This input should be in accordance with the JFC guidance letter,
making the production of the Air Operations Directive (AOD) more rapid and efficient.
The strategy division takes the JFC guidance letter and JFACC interpretation of the
guidance letter and writes the AOD. The JFACC interpretation is based on the Intelligence,
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Division’s (ISRD) continuously updated intelligence
preparation of the battlespace. All of this guidance is taken into account in the preparation
of the Joint Air Operations Plan (JAOP).
Target Development begins with the strategy division prioritizing operational tasks
to meet the JFACC written guidance. After the operational tasks have been prioritized,
component representative will nominate target sets mapping back to the published tasks.
The ISRD’s targets and combat assessment team merges all of the nominated targets
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Figure 2.1

Air Tasking Cycle [1, 1-12]

into a proposed target list for the Target Effects Team (TET). The TET aligns targets
with the objectives in a draft Joint Integrated Prioritized Target List (JIPTL). The JFACC
reviews and approves the JIPTL during the briefing conducted by the TET working group.
Likewise, the JFACC approves the prioritized, facility-level Candidate Target List/Target
Nomination List (CTL/TNL) after being adjusted/altered and approved by the JFC.
The third step is to develop weaponeering and allocation solutions. This process
begins by the JIPTL returning to the targets and combat assessment team to have each
apportioned target weaponeered. Next, the JIPTL goes to the Master Air Attack Plan
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(MAAP) process where JFACC resources are matched to each target. The MAAP process
can change the cut line based on support considerations.
The next step is to produce and disseminate the ATO. The ATO is developed by
combining collection planning and target planning. This ensures the targets selected
for the ATO are matched with collection requirements for pre-strike verification and
post-strike Battle Damage Assessment. After the ATO, Special Instructions (SPINs)
and ISR synchronization matrix are developed, the data is compiled into Theater Battle
Management Core System (TBMCS) and electronically transmitted to all users.
Execution planning and Force execution and the assessment process complete the
cycle. During the execution phase the JFACC controls operations from the AOC. As the
ATO is being executed and Mission Reports are distributed, operational assessments are
determined. The air tasking cycle completes one evolution as the Operational Assessment
Team meets to determine the effectiveness of air operation and, with JFACC approval,
sends recommended air actions for the JFC to consider in his next guidance letter.
2.1.1.2

Battle Rhythm.

After entering the execution phase, the AOC will

fall into a battle rhythm. The battle rhythm will vary greatly depending on a number of
factors and can be different for each exercise and contingency. A notional ATO battle
rhythm has been developed in Joint Publication 3-30, Command and Control for Joint Air
Operations. The time line for this notional battle rhythm is shown in Figure 2.2.
At any given time there will be four simultaneous ATOs being planned and/or
executed.

Figure 2.3 shows a typical battle rhythm for ATO development through

assessment. The ATO progression is development (ATOs D and E), tasking (ATO C),
execution (ATO B), and assessment (ATO A). In the diagram, ATO E begins after ATO
A has been executed and is being assessed. Note that these figures are notional and
that specific battle rhythms and planning cycles may be different for each component
based upon their operational procedures. For example, the Joint Force Special Operations
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Figure 2.2

Battle Rhythm Time Line [1, 1-13]

Component Commander uses a bottom up planning method that may cause targeting well
inside of the AOC planning cycle previously described.
The Air Tasking Cycle and the AOC Battle Rhythm have been presented as linear
processes. While this is true at a high level of abstraction, it should be noted that there
are many feedback loops throughout the process which are not captured at this level of
abstraction. This feedback may be in the form of incomplete or substandard products
which go back to the originating team/division for revisions. In discussions with Major
Paul Lambertson, who has invaluable experience as Chief of C-17 Tactics in the CAOC,
it has been indicated that it is common to go through many revisions of the ATO during
the execution day. These abnormalities of the air tasking cycle have been noted and are
well suited for future studies. The Air Tasking Cycle is assumed to be a perfectly linear
process for our study.
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Figure 2.3
2.1.2

ATO Battle Rhythm [1, 1-14]

AOC Organizational Structure.

The AOC is composed of divisions

responsible for strategy, plans, operations, intelligence, and air mobility. Each of these five
divisions is composed of teams and/or cells. Various sources emphasize different aspects
of the AOC, but the AFOTTP manual for Air and Space Operations Center provides the
most comprehensive description of the AOC and is an excellent source for additional
information.
Each division is supported by specialists in communications, weather, Information
Operations, and other functional areas as needed. This basic structure of an AOC is
shown in Figure 2.4. The size of the AOC can vary greatly depending on the missions
being performed and the number of forces involved. The capability of the AOC can also
vary from some limited capability in order to perform unopposed humanitarian assistance
operations to a fully operational AOC capable of supporting an effort such as Operation
Desert Storm or Operation Iraqi Freedom. Regardless of the size or capability level of an
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AOC, the need for the JFACC to have a single command and control system to exercise
control over forces remains the same.

Figure 2.4

2.1.2.1

Basic AOC Structure [1, 1-4]

Strategy Division.

The Strategy Division is responsible for

the “long-range planning of air, space, and information operations to achieve theater
objectives by developing refining, disseminating, and assessing the JFACC air and space
strategy” [1, 3-1]. Typically the strategy division is organized into three functional teams:
Strategy Plans Team, Strategy Guidance Team, and the Operational Assessment Team.
The strategy division also has Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Division
(ISRD) personnel nested in order to provide direct intelligence support. Figure 2.5 shows
the typical strategy division organizational and operational roles.
The strategy plans team main responsibility is to develop and maintain an
operational-level, long range joint air strategy that supports the JFC’s objectives. The
strategy plans team leads the JAOC in the development of the Joint Air Operations Plan
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Figure 2.5

Strategy Division Team Construct [1, 3-4]

(JAOP) which includes a prioritized, effects-based targeting scheme. The strategy plans
team also is responsible for the development of operational-level guidance in the Air
Operations Directive (AOD). The strategy plans team can also act as the JFACC’s action
group for Course of Action (COA) development and strategy related special projects.
The strategy guidance team is responsible for the AOC’s transition from operationallevel planning to tactical-level planning. The strategy guidance team also assists in the
detailing of the daily guidance in the AOD. This team provides short range guidance from
48 to 72 hours prior to ATO execution. This guidance is contained in the AOD.
The last team under the strategy division is the operational assessment team. The
operational assessment team is involved in all aspects of strategy development while
concentrating on evaluating the effectiveness and efficiency of air, space and information
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operations. This team assists the other strategy division teams in producing the JAOP and
AOD.
2.1.2.2

Combat Plans Division.

The Combat Plans Division (CPD)

develops plans for near-term air and space operations. Typically, this is the 48 hour
time period prior to an ATO execution. The combat plans division uses JFC and JFACCapproved guidance received through the strategy division to develop detailed plans for
air and space operations. The near-term planning is accomplished through the four
functionally oriented teams that compose the combat plans division. The combat plans
division’s organizational structure is shown in Figure 2.6.

Figure 2.6

Combat Plans Division [1, 4-1]

“The Targeting Effects Team (TET) is the linkage between the JFACC’s vision and
its practical application” [1, 4-5]. The TET’s primary mission is to ensure the daily target
selection process reflects the guidance found in the AOD. This includes the production
of the daily draft Joint Integrated Prioritized Target List (JIPTL) and inputs into the
JFACC’s Component Prioritized Collection List (CPCL). A process called the Strategy-toTask Methodology is used to guarantee that each target on the JFC’s JIPTL can be traced
directly back to a JFC campaign objective. The effects on JIPTL targets can be kinetic or
non-kinetic. For example, kinetic effects would be used for either a hard or soft kill while
non-kinetic effects might include a leaflet drop on a ground unit. The JIPTL must include
all of the joint force’s prioritized targets, even if it is a non-kinetic effects target. The
JIPTL should also clearly indicate the desired effect of all prioritized targets. In addition,
the JIPTL may include both fixed and mobile targets.
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The TET also provides inputs to the Strategy Plans/Guidance Team for use in
the initial development of the AOD. The Target Development Cell in the Intelligence
Surveillance, Reconnaissance Division (ISRD) will produce the air and space component
Target Nomination List (TNL), and merge this TNL with all other component TNLs into
one integrated TNL. The TET uses the integrated TNL and the approved AOD to develop
the draft JIPTL. The TET inputs to the JFACC’s Component Prioritized Collection List
(CPCL) are sent to the ISR Operations Team for collection plan development.
The MAAP Team develops the daily Master Air Attack Plan and loads it into the
Theater Battle Management Core System (TBMCS) to use during ATO production. “The
Master Air Attack Plan is the JFACC’s time-phased air and space scheme of maneuver
for a given ATO period and it synthesizes JFACC guidance, desired effects, supported
component’s scheme of maneuver, available resources, friendly capabilities, and enemy
capabilities”[1, 4-21]. The MAAP team is composed of highly trained representatives
from across the spectrum of air and space disciplines. In order to accomplish its mission,
the MAAP team must maintain clear, two-way lines of communication in order to
coordinate with other CPD teams, JFACC staff, Component/Service representatives, and
host/coalition representatives.
The ATO Production Team assembles, disseminates, and publishes the daily ATO.
The ATO is the primary document containing the guidance, tasking, and apportionment of
all available air and space resources. The AFOTTP 2-3.2 outlines many responsibilities
for the ATO Production Team, some of which have been listed below:
• Review the most current version of the Rules Of Engagement, all detailed execution
plans, and supporting SPINs required to develop and produce the ATO.
• Create and maintain accurate air and space planning databases in the theater battle
management system and/or applications. This will normally include regular and
periodic data backups. Effect quality control procedures to ensure accuracy of data
inputs, worksheets, and other baseline planning materials.
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• Input complete, accurate, properly formatted, and timely mission tasking to theater
battle management applications using standard ATO formats, as required.
• Accomplish a comprehensive ATO review.
• After approval for release, disseminate the ATO to tasked units and agencies by the
most expeditious means available.
The C2 Planning Team is composed of multiple functional teams that correspond
to different roles that the JFACC assumes (i.e., Airspace Control Authority, Area Air
Defense Commander, Space Control Authority, etc). The C2 Planning team is composed
of Airspace Management, Air Defense, C2 Architecture, and C2 Communications
Planning Teams. The Airspace Management Planning Team supports both the Combat
Operations and Combat Plans Divisions. The CPD Airspace Management Planning Team
is responsible for developing the Airspace Control Order (ACO). The C2 Planning Team
is also responsible for developing and distributing several other critical documents. Air
traffic controllers, air defense personnel, and C2 subject matter experts from service
components and coalition partners must be incorporated in C2 Planning Team. The
Combat Operations Division (COD) Airspace Management Team is responsible for
executing the ACO by making real time changes and deconflicting immediate requests
for airspace.
2.1.2.3

Combat Operations Division.

The COD adjusts the ATO, as

necessary, to respond to battlefield dynamics. The COD publishes changes to the ATO and
ACO as necessary. The COD is composed of offensive and defensive operations teams,
and the ISR Senior Intelligence Duty Officer (SIDO) Team. The SIDO Team includes
assigned ISR support, airspace management, weather, and the air and space component’s
Rescue Coordination Center. The COD is also the focal point for monitoring the execution
of joint and combined operations, such as Joint Air Attack Team, Theater Missile Defense,
and Joint Suppression of Enemy Air Defense supported by theater forces. Personnel
assigned or attached to the COD support the offensive effort, the defensive effort, or both.
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The ATO is typically released 12 hours prior to execution. The COD assumes responsibility of the ATO as soon as it is released.
“The Offensive Operations Team is responsible for executing the ATO and makes
command and control decisions to ensure the theater offensive air campaign is executed
in accordance with commander’s guidance, and in reaction to the current battlespace
situation for all offensive missions”[1, 5-6]. The Offensive Operations Team is organized
by mission (Close Air Support, Interdiction, Electronic Warfare/Suppression of Enemy
Air Defenses, etc.) and is supplemented by weapons systems experts. The Offensive
Operations Team continually monitors the battlespace and recommends changes to the
ATO based on unforeseen challenges and opportunities.
“The Defensive Operations Team provides C2 battle management within the theater,
and oversight of the overall execution of theater air and missile defense operations”[1, 547]. Defensive Operations Team personnel monitor the status of air defense assets and
assist the Senior Offensive Duty Officer to provide offensive targeting and direction to
attack assets. “The Defensive Operations Team normally manages the data link network,
provides the JFACC with a consolidated and accurate air/battlespace picture, and provides
direction to attached units relative to Air Defense Operations, and changes to Air Defense
Warning status”[1, 5-47]. In order to achieve their mission, defensive operations personnel
have access to a wide variety of communications equipment used to manage command and
control assets for the entire air defense effort.
ISR processes in the COD will be led by the Senior Intelligence Duty Officer
(SIDO). The SIDO’s Team provides Situation Analysis, Target Duty Officers, and ISR
Operations specialists. “The SIDO Team is responsible for real-time situational and
predictive analysis of the adversary in the battlespace, monitoring and dynamically
adjusting ISR collection plans, monitoring current day’s ATO targets and recommending
reroles and tracking and highlighting dynamic targets and time sensitive targets”[1, 5-71].
The SIDO Team is heavily dependent on regular updates from the ISRD.
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2.1.2.4

ISR Division.

The Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance

Division (ISRD) is responsible with providing the JFC and JFACC situational awareness
of the adversary in order to maintain an accurate and up-to-date target list. The ISRD
mission includes monitoring “current and emerging enemy capabilities, threats, courses
of action (COA) and centers of gravity with predictive and actionable intelligence,
and to provide the JFACC with ISR operations management and targeting intelligence
support”[1, 6-1]. As can already be seen by the discussion of previous divisions, the
ISRD has nested portions in all of the other four divisions. The ISRD provides critical
information to the other four divisions as they plan and execute air and space operations.
This information not only enables the commanders objectives to be accomplished, but
also provides an assessment of previous operations. The responsibilities of ISR personnel
nested inside the other divisions is summarized in the list below:
• Provide analysis of the enemy and a common threat picture to the JFACC and Staff
Planners, other JAOC divisions and other AF elements in theater.
• Provide, in conjunction with the Strategy Division, Combat Plans Division and
Combat Operations Division, for planning and executing airborne ISR operations
and providing combat ISR support to planning, execution, and assessment activities.
• Direct the JAOC’s distributed and reachback ISR processes by working with
national agencies, Air Force organizations, and the processing, exploitation, and
dissemination architecture to optimize ISR contributions to the effort.
• Provide direct targeting support to the Air Tasking Cycle in response to JFACC
guidance.
• Provide all-source intelligence support to other JAOC divisions to enhance the
execution of their core processes.
• Ensure actionable, decision quality, all-source Intelligence Preparation of the
Battlespace (IPB) and threat information depicted in the JFACC and JAOC picture
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of the battlespace is consistent with that used by National, Joint, Component, and
Theater entities. Aggressively act to resolve significant differences.
• Ensure Air Force ISR is optimally managed to operate within the context of a large
and complex national and joint intelligence architecture. Serve as the focal point for
multiple nodes to work together in order to meet the high demand for information.
“The Analysis, Correlation and Fusion Team (ACF) conducts dynamic intelligence
preparation of the battlespace (IPB) that provides the context for understanding the
adversary’s intentions and supports the application of Predictive Battlespace Awareness
(PBA)” [1, 6-5]. The ACF can be organized in different ways depending on the situation
and current needs. A functionally organized ACF is well suited for non-traditional or
asymmetric treats. It is critical for the ACF to maintain a close working relationship with
other branch intelligence elements.
The Targets/Combat Assessment Team coordinates targets and combat assessment
functions for the JFACC. The team is comprised of two primary cells, the Target
Development Cell and the Combat Assessment Cell.

There are targeteers assigned

throughout the other JAOC divisions to ensure continuity in the targeting effort. Each
step of the ATO cycle contains elements of the targeting process. “Targeting as a whole
is an integration of strategy, plans, intelligence, and operations and can be applied at the
strategic, operational, or tactical level”[1, 6-45]. The targeting process closely aligns itself
with the air tasking cycle phases. Even though the air tasking phases are shown sequentially, it is not uncommon for targeteers to perform several of the phases simultaneously.
ISR operations are the process of developing ISR strategy and plans and executing
and adjusting those plans to satisfy theater intelligence requirements. The ISR operations
process in the JAOC is the responsibility of the ISR Operations Team and is accomplished
through a collaborative effort of collection managers, reconnaissance and surveillance
planners, Chief Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination (PED), and PED centers to
ensure ISR operations are synchronized with joint operations.
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“The PED Management Team is the ISRD focal point for implementing, coordinating, and maintaining PED support from units/agencies outside the JAOC”[1, 6-147].
Responsibilities include: directing, managing, and coordinating all PED activities in
support of the JAOC. The PED Management Team monitors ISR assets and PED mission
execution, identifies discrepancies in the PED mission, and institutes control measures
to correct or improve the PED process. The process of gathering and metrics for ISR
Operations assessment is manpower intensive due to the lack of automation.
2.1.2.5

Air Mobility Division.

The Air Mobility Division (AMD) is

comprised of five teams: Airlift Control Team, Air Mobility Control Team, Air Refueling
Control Team, Aeromedical Evacuation Control Team, and Air Mobility Element. The
Air Mobility Element deploys as a liaison element of HQ Air Mobility Command
Tanker/Airlift Control Center (TACC) in controlling Air Mobility Command (AMC)
missions. Figure 2.7 depicts the standard AMD organization. The Director of Mobility
Forces is responsible for integrating the total air mobility effort for the JFACC, and
providing direction to the AMD to execute the air mobility mission.
The AMD will plan, coordinate, task, and execute the intra-theater air mobility and
air refueling mission. The AMD provides for integration and support of all air mobility
missions. This integration and support of all air mobility missions incorporates the AMD
in all phases of the air tasking cycle. The AMD coordinates movement requirements with
the JFC movement requirements and control authority, the theater Air Mobility Operations
Control Center, and the AMC TACC. As directed by the Director of Mobility Forces, the
AMD will task assigned/attached theater air mobility forces.
The Airlift Control Team (ALCT) is the source of intra-theater expertise within
the AMD. The ALCT brings theater airlift functional expertise from the theater organizations to plan, schedule, coordinate, and manage theater airlift operations and airspace.
The ALCT develops and integrates the airlift schedule into the ATO and ACO. The
ALCT processes validated airlift requirements from the Theater Movement Validation
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Figure 2.7

Air Mobility Division Organization [1, 7-2]

Authority or Joint Movement Center and develop the intra-theater airlift schedule. The
ALCT integrates the intra-theater and inter-theater airlift schedules and airspace usage
into TBMCS and validates the integration of the airlift schedule into the ATO/ACO. The
ALCT will integrate its activities with all other AMD teams and support functions as much
as possible to support the total mobility effort.
The Air Refueling Control Team (ARCT) plans, tasks, and schedules air-refueling
missions under the control of the JFACC to support theater air and space operations. It
coordinates the air refueling planning, tasking, and scheduling to support air bridge and
global attack missions. The ARCT will integrate its activities with the CPD to support
the master air attack planning (MAAP) and ATO/ACO production development. The
ARCT incorporates the capability to accomplish intra-theater and long-range air-refueling
planning and coordinate inter-theater air refueling planning.
2-16

The Air Mobility Control Team (AMCT) serves as the centralized source of theater
air mobility command, control, and communications (C3) during mission execution. The
AMCT will direct, or redirect as required, air mobility forces in concert with other air
and space forces to respond to requirement changes, higher priorities, or immediate
execution limitations. The AMCT will deconflict all air mobility mission and airspace
usage operations into, out of, and within the area of responsibility. The AMCT will
maintain execution process and communications connectivity for tasking, coordination,
and mission forces.
The Aeromedical Evacuation Coordination Team (AECT) is responsible for
operational planning, scheduling, and execution of scheduled and unscheduled
Aeromedical Evacuation (AE) missions, and positioning of AE ground support assets.
The AECT maintains both secure and non-secure communications links with all AE
components. The AECT, in conjunction with the ALCT, assigns resources required to
execute the AE mission and ensure integration into the ATO/ACO. The AECT coordinates
closely with the Rescue Coordination Center to establish a proactive stance for AE
missions following Combat Search and Rescue recoveries. The AECT develops plans and
strategies and determines number and location of AE assets required to support operations.
2.1.3

Organizational Involvement in the Air Tasking Cycle.

Each of the five

divisions is an integral part of the air tasking cycle. Often their areas of responsibilities
overlap, creating a need for communication and coherency between the divisions. Figure
2.8 shows which steps of the air tasking cycle each division is involved. The ISR division
as well as the air mobility division is involved throughout the air tasking cycle. Every
step of the six step process requires the involvement of at least three divisions with the
exception of target development, which requires four of the five divisions. It is assumed
that even though each of the divisions is composed of multiple teams, the divisions must
remain collocated. The relationship between the organization structure of the AOC, the
air tasking cycle, and the battle rhythm provide the foundation to be able to build a static
and executable architecture for the AOC.
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Figure 2.8
2.2

Division Involvement in the Air Tasking Cycle

Communication Theory
2.2.1

Introduction.

What is lost in the transfer of information when face-to-

face communication is not possible? It is important to understand how the communication medium can influence group processes and outcomes.

Not only how the

communication medium affects the timeliness of the information, but how the quality
of outcomes is affected. Research conducted in parallel with our study was conducted
by a group of Intermediate Developmental Education (IDE) students: Majors Brian
Baude, Shannon Beggeman, Christopher Eichorst, Christopher Lindell, and Thomas
“Lou” Rauls. Their thesis titled “Net-Centric Analysis of Air Operations” provides a
significant amount of background to our research on how communication effects the
ATO Cycle in a Split-AOC configuration. The following sections elaborate on applicable
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research conducted on numerous disciplines including and not limited too, communication, decision science, organizational behavior, business practices, computer science,
and most notably psychology.
2.2.2

AOC Communication Requirements.

As mentioned in section 2.1,

there are many teams/individuals contributing to the ATO cycle. To effectively model
distributed functions in the ATO cycle, the communication dynamics must be documented.
A collocated AOC has many levels of potential communication from face-to-face to email
and when one fails, another can be easily substituted. In a distributed environment, faceto-face communication is replaced by additional virtual tools. The loss of fidelity due to
distributed communication must be quantified to effectively represent the distributed AOC.
To do this, information exchange requirements (IER) are identified for every communication. These requirements encompass both the information being exchanged and the
types of supporting communication media. A prioritized list of media can be created for
each communication which allows some flexibility to the distribution of functionality and
allows us to apply meaningful values to the resulting degradation as lower priority options
are employed. [16, 30]
2.2.3

Effects of Communication Media.

To bring context to our problem of

identifying IERs of the AOC, let us first examine communication in general. Over the
last 40 years much has been written on communication, but much of it is not straightforward. [18, xiii] However, much of the research which quantifies communication needs
has centered on data transfer, which is useful to determine network-sizing requirements,
but does little to evaluate the effect of communication media on human communication
needs such as group processes and outcomes. [18, xiii] [16, 32]
2.2.3.1

Virtual Collaboration.

Examining the ATO cycle of the AOC’s

current configuration, one quickly realizes the reason for a collocated AOC is to allow
members of many organizations to come together (such as in face-to-face briefings) to
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produce products (e.g. MAAP, JIPTL, ATO) which eventually lead to outcomes (e.g.
successful missions, effects based operations, bombs on targets). The communication
theory that centers on group processes and outcomes is referred to as “collaboration.”
To seriously study the prospects of split-configurations of an AOC, one must understand
how the type of communication media can affect group collaborations.

According

to Wainfan and Davis, “Virtual Collaborations are collaborations in which the people
working together are independent in their task, share responsibility for outcomes, are
geographically dispersed, and rely on mediated, rather than face-to-face communication
to produce an outcome, such as a shared understanding, evaluation, strategy recommendation, decision, action plan, or other products.” [18, xi]
Video Tele-Conferencing (VTC), Audio-Conferencing (AC) (i.e. telephone), and
Computer-Mediated Communication (CMC) are different media forms of virtual collaborations. Much of the research conducted in virtual collaboration focus on comparing each
media to face-to-face (FTF) communication.
2.2.3.2

Problems and Benefits of Virtual Collaborations.

Many leaders

will note they prefer FTF communication because they place high value in “looking
them in the eye.” Military Commanders often note the importance of reading someone’s
reactions. Often information is sketchy, and its quality can only be communicated through
face-to-face communication where the commander can see the speaker’s confidence or
lack thereof. [16, 28] Nevertheless, there are benefits to virtual collaboration which
include:
• Broadening Reach: Meetings can include participants that are geographically
dispersed.
• Adaptability: People can be added quickly to a meeting when their participation
becomes apparent.
• Time and Money: It is easier to move electrons than people. Moving people requires
significant logistics and support both during the move and at the deployed location.
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• Safety: Fewer people need to be in the theater of operations, a dangerous location.
• Survivability/vulnerability: More than a single (un)lucky missile is required to
destroy the AOC.
2.2.3.3

Relating Media Types.

The following sections explain the

differences between communication media. Table 2.1 characterizes the different types
of media in simple terms and Figure 2.9 shows notational relationships between types of
communication media.

Mode
Videoconference
(VC)

Audio
Conference
(AC)

Computermediated
communication
(CMC)

Table 2.1 Characterization of Media [17, 4]
Defining Characteristics
Examples
Useful real-time images and
Group videoconferencing in
voices of other participants;
dedicated rooms; desktop
may include other shared
videoconferencing.
images/text.
Voice communication, but no Phone calls, conference calls,
useful real-time video images or conference calls where
of other participants; may
people are also sharing views
include other shared images,
of images or documents.
data, and text.
Text, images and other data
E-mail, chat rooms,
received via computer,
discussion boards, text
without effective real-time
messaging, instant
voice or video images of
messaging, shated databases,
other participants.
application-specific
groupware.

Video Tele-conferencing vs. Face-to-face communication.

VTC can

be thought of as communicating with interactive video. Participants may also use graphics
and/or whiteboards to display information. There are two types of VTC: “classic VTC”
when groups gathered in dedicated conference rooms, and desktop VTC which will be
discussed later.
When comparing classic VTC to FTF communication one must first note that VTC
image quality has improved since the early studies. However, today it still can be difficult
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Figure 2.9

Notational Relationships [17, 66]

to maintain eye contact and it is challenging to interpret body language and gestures,
especially as the number of participants increases. Wainfan and Davis also suggest,
“mediated communication limits nonverbal, paraverbal, and status cue and reduces the
‘richness’ of the information exchange.” [18, 19]
Other research suggests that VTC tends to be less social and more task oriented [15,
63-74] which is good for producing a product. However, more advance preparation is
necessary, and meetings conducted via VTC take longer than FTF. [24] The most likely
cause of VTCs taking longer is participants’ difficulty in conveying information and the
structured communication flow often associated with VTCs.
As for desktop VTC, software called Group Support Software is used to view and
operate common screens (e.g., PowerPoint Presentation or a computer program). Potential
exists for the quick organization of meetings, however little research has been conducted
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in this area. Available research suggests desktop VTC is effective among members already
acquainted and teamed. [18, 22-23]
Audio-conferencing vs. Face-to-face Communication.

Audio-

conferencing removes all visual cues about other participants, reducing the ability to show
understanding or agreements, forecast responses, enhance verbal descriptions, manage
extended pauses, express attitudes through posture and facial expression, and provide
nonverbal information. [23]
A study by France, Anderson, and Gardner shows that during AC leaders talk more.
Meaning leaders dominant the conversation, where other participants of the conference
may not engage in the conversation simple due to the fact the leaders have the floor. This
dominance was approximately three times greater than in FTF meetings. This reduction
of interaction by other participants illuminates the drawbacks to AC including group
understanding, problem solving and innovation. [18, 24]
Computer Mediated Communication vs. Face-to-face Communication.
CMC is typically text-based, although it can include drawings, photographs, and other
images including happy faces or emoticons (types of happy faces trying to express
emotion).

CMC is either synchronous (i.e., chat rooms or instant messaging) or

asynchronous (i.e., e-mail, discussion boards, or shared databases).
Synchronization of CMC is important to the type of information exchange taking
place. When individuals or groups are in the middle of collaboration, a high degree of
synchronization is important. However when information just needs to be reviewable, a
high level of synchronization is not important. Figure 2.10 shows how the synchronization
of different medias relates to presence of non-verbal and paraverbal cues.
In CMC all participants can contribute equally; group brainstorming is often
enhanced. This enhancement of group brainstorming can be contributed to the media’s
wider reach for subject matter experts (i.e. reach back) and the inability of leaders to
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Figure 2.10

Synchronization of Different Medias [17, 5]

dominate the floor. Often in a FTF meeting, a participant may have an idea but can not
express this idea until the floor is available. In a chat room ideas can be expressed freely
and can be displayed as fast as the participant can type. This allows the group to focus on
the task at hand rather than social considerations. [18]
However CMC groups often take longer to complete tasks than do FTF groups. [8]
and miscommunication may happen more often when cues that indicate emotion are not
annotated. [18]
2.2.3.4

Mitigating Problems of Mediated Communication.

In review of

the different communication modes one quickly realizes some tasks are better performed
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by CMC than by others. Information exchange between people that evolves data that needs
to be regularly reviewed can be as effective in CMC as in FTF. Again Figure 2.9 shows
a notational relationship between communication media and information exchange. Take
for example a weather report, if an email or webpage containing satellite pictures and text
detailing predictions for hourly temperature and precipitation. CMC can often deliver the
data as well as FTF. However, FTF seems best for interpersonal exchanges that require
complex thinking, negotiations, or discussing problems that are ill defined. In the context
of an AOC, FTF meetings are especially useful for generating and checking commitment
to courses of action. [18, 65]
When thinking of split operations of an AOC, how can one best utilize and mitigate
the effects of different communication modes? Many authors recommend the best way to
mitigate the effects of different communication modes is to first have FTF interaction with
team members and joint training on the use of different communication methods. This can
be referred to as “grounding in communication”.
An AFIT group project [16, 32] cites Herbert H. Clark’s theory on “grounding” [17].
“In essence grounding is the process of the listener understanding, the speaker knowing the
listener understood, and the listener knowing the speaker knows the listener understood.
Over time, the communicators build ‘common ground’ - information that participants
know that they all know. Large common ground becomes a significant advantage for
communicators.” Take for examples special operations forces. They often are able to pass
significant amount of information, between members of the squad, through hand signals.
This only can come with time and training.
2.2.4

Modeling Communication.

The method presented by the previous AFIT

group to model communication in an AOC provides a quantitative analysis that evaluates
the communication media available, the communication path, and assigns values to the
particular information characteristics being evaluated. To note, the communication path
identifies the different domains that the information must travel through and is covered
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in Section 2.2.4.1.

Assigning value to the Information Characteristics may include

complexity, speed, and security and is covered in Section 2.2.4.2. Section 2.2.4.3 covers
evaluating the communication media and communication path with the values assigned to
the Information Characteristics.
2.2.4.1

Determining Communications Paths.

Determining communi-

cation paths involves identifying the different domains in which information may reside.
The domains include the physical, informational, and cognitive domains. Information at
the physical domain is considered the “truth” source, meaning this is the best quality of
information. This may or may not be one hundred percent accurate, but it is the highest
fidelity the information will have in the communication process. “Truth sources” include
physical data (i.e. radar, infrared sensors), and guidance (i.e. plans and intentions).
The information domain is just data. Interpreting and understanding information is the
cognitive domain.
Different communication path information might take include cognitive to cognitive
(C-C), physical to information to cognitive (P-I-C), cognitive to information to
information to cognitive (C-I-I-C), and information to information (I-I). C-C can be
considered as individuals or groups talking face-to-face. P-I-C can be considered the
sensor-to-shooter path. The I-I path is simply data transfers assuming a network with
sufficient bandwidth. C-I-I-C can be considered as CMC, or even VTC or AC. Figure
2.11 shows the communications paths.
2.2.4.2

Information Characteristics.

When making a list of character-

istics of information, the IDE group [16, 32] modified definitions from other sources
to more appropriately meet the needs of the AOC. The intent of the list in Table 2.2 is
to determine which communication medium would best handle a particular information
characteristic. [16, 38]
After examining the list, Importance, Complexity, Speed, and Security were
determined to be the best characteristic to evaluate the effectiveness of the communication
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Figure 2.11
Table 2.2

Communication Paths [16, 36]

Characteristics of Information [16, 38]

mediums. Although important, the other characteristics were not considered as having
primary effects on the success of information exchange. [16] After further evaluation
of the four main characteristics, our group felt that Importance of the information could
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actually be made up of Speed, Security, and Reliability of the communication medium.
Speed refers to how fast important information can be created; security is how secure
that information must be during transmission; Reliability refers to the dependability of the
particular medium to transmit said information. In our effort to evaluate the effects of the
communication medium on the ATO cycle we defined the reliability of the communication
medium as a measure of how often and how long a communication medium is interrupted.
2.2.4.3

Evaluate Communication Media and Path.

The ability of the

communication medium and the requirements of the communication path are two areas
that are difficult to measure objectively. To measure theses areas objectively a numerical
system ranging from 0 to 10 (10 being best) is used to assign value to the characteristics
of information. Tables 2.3 through 2.6 show the scale definitions.[16, 40-41]
Table 2.3
Complexity
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0

Ranking Communication Complexity

Impossible to communicate without explanation, meaning is important
Difficult to convey without listener feedback
Difficult to convey
Can be represented by text, graphic somewhat inaccurate
Can be represented by text, graphic somewhat accurate
Can be represented by text, graphic accurate
Easily represented by text and graphics
Easily represented by text or graphics
Easily represented by text or graphics extremely accurately
Compiled raw data
Raw data

In evaluating the limitations of the communication mediums in a particular
communication domain, a combination of theory, current usages of the AOC, and normal
usage is employed. Using the 0-10 scales, the limitations for each communication in
the AOC are then assigned. Table 2.7 shows the values chosen for the limitations of the
communication mediums. Each communication medium is assumed to operate at a certain
level or below for each of the four characteristics.
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Table 2.4
Security
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0

Ranking Communication Security

Highly critical that only a very few, certain parties receive, sender assured
Critical that only a very few, certain parties receive, sender assured
Critical that only a very few, certain parties receive
Medium distribution, top secret level
Large distribution, top secret level
Small distribution, secret level
Medium distribution, secret level
Large distribution, secret level
FOUO
Military information
Open
Table 2.5

2.2.4.4

Ranking Communication Speed
Speed
10
Instantaneous
9
1 minute
8
5 minutes
7
30 minutes
6
1 hour
5
Several hours
4
1 day
3
Several days
2
1 week
1
At any time
0
No requirement

Evaluate AOC Information Exchange Requirements.

The DoDAF

OV-3 product from the AOC architecture created by MITRE identified over 1200 IERs
from the AOC to external nodes. MITRE listed an additional 283 IERs internal to the
AOC. While the OV-3 is ideal to identifying IERs, the OV-3 created by MITRE fails to
identify sending and receiving parties in the AOC. [16] Table 2.8 shows an example of
internal IERS identified in the OV-3. Because the current form of the OV-3 cannot be used
to evaluate or model the IERs between divisions in the AOC the previous AFIT research
group decided to focus on the communications involved in 51 processes performed by the
five AOC divisions.
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Table 2.6
Reliability
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
Table 2.7

Ranking Communication Reliability
Uninterruptible
Extremely seldom temporary losses
Very seldom temporary losses
Seldom temporary losses
Sporadic temporary losses
Extremely seldom extended losses
Very seldom extended losses
Seldom extended losses
Sporadic extended losses
Widely spaced moments of availability
No connectivity

Limitations of Communications Media [16, 41]

The previous AFIT research group states, “The Senior Mentor’s briefing, ’Overview
of How the C/JFACC Commands and Controls Air and Space Power through the C/JAOC,’
emphasized the processes within the AOC. This briefing, developed by the C2 Warrior
School at the 505th TRS, used the processes as outlined in the AFDD-2 to illustrate the
responsibilities each division has during the AOC cycle.” [16, 18] With use of the 505th
courseware, the group examined each of the 51 processes to determine the high level IERs
Using a similar methodology of evaluating the limitations of communication
mediums, the required communication medium for each IER could be determined. Each
IER is assigned into one of the four communication paths (C-C, P-I-C, C-I-I-C, I-I), and
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Table 2.8

MITRE OV-3 Excerpt

ascribed relevant values to the data and communication requirements in accordance with
the 0-10 scales. Then to compare the limitations of the communication medium and the
communication requirements needed for the IERs the AFIT research group created what
they call the OV-3x. Table 2.9 show the OV-3x created by the group to evaluate the effects
of the communication mediums on the ATO cycle for a split AOC. Appendix B section
OV-3 shows our efforts to use the OV-3x and map each of the 51 processes to appropriate
transitions used in our executable architecture. Sections 3.2 and 4.1 explain our efforts of
using the OV-3x in an executable architecture.

2.3

DoD Architecture Framework (DoDAF)
For distributed AOC operations, we must carefully plan out which form of

communication is going to be used for each step of the ATO cycle. The tool used to
communicate this design is architecture. This is similar in importance to a blue-print used
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Table 2.9

OV-3x [16, 47]

to build a house. An architecture shows how everything fits together. The structure of the
underlying components is defined and the communications between those components are
depicted.
The DoDAF defines a common approach in the DoD for architecture description,
development, presentation, and integration for both warfighting operations and business
operations and processes. [7, 1-1] Easier said, the DoDAF gives the DoD a common
language to describe architectures. This section will cover what an architecture is, the
history of the development of the DoDAF and DoDAF’s description and definition of
different architecture views. Views used in the development of executable architectures
will be covered in more detail in section 2.4.
2.3.1

Architectures and the DoD.

This section details why the DoD decided

to start using architectures and what an architecture is. In October 1995, the Deputy
Sectary of Defense directed that a DoD-wide effort be undertaken to define and develop
better means and processes for ensuring that Command, Control, Communications, and
Intelligence (C4ISR) capabilities meet the needs of the warfighter. [6, 1-5] This was in
direct response to increasing joint and multinational operations being conducted by the
DoD. The DoD had discovered that newer technology was being applied piecemeal. [29,
14] The intra-service communication systems could not correspond with or work with
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communication systems from other services let alone communication systems of other
countries. For example, during the Persian Gulf War of 1991, it became evident that
communication between Services was severely lacking. The ATO generated at the AOC
by Air Force personnel could not be transmitted securely to Navy aircraft carriers. In an
effort to circumvent this problem the AOC would generate a paper copy of the ATO and
have it flown out to the Navy’s aircraft carriers. [29, 14]
With this inability of the communication systems to correspond to one another and
with increasing uncertainty about requirements, rapid changes in technology, changes
in organizational structures, and a widening spectrum of missions and operations, the
DoD had to find a way to deal with these uncertainties. [10, 1] In the past, the services,
individual commands, and independent DoD agencies would develop their own solutions
to these uncertainties.

[25, 1] However, the DoD had to deal not only with these

uncertainties, but also their other interoperability issues. In need of a solution, the DoD
looked to information architectures. Dr. Alexander Levis, former Chief Scientist of the
Air Force and a proponent of executable architectures, states “Information architectures
can provide current and future descriptions of a domain composed of components and their
interconnections, actions or activates those components perform, and rules or constraints
for those activates.” [10, 1] Hence, information architectures can provide the DoD a way
to define and develop C4ISR capabilities to meet the needs of the warfighter.
2.3.1.1

Description of Architecture.

What is an architecture? Often when

one thinks of an architect and architectures, one thinks of a designer and the design of
buildings and bridges. However, in the world of Systems Engineering we think of an
architect as one needed to create any structure that is both unprecedented and complex.
[21] [22] According to IEEE an Architecture is defined as:
The fundamental organization of a system embodied in its components,
their relationships to each other and to the environment and the principles
guiding its design and evolution. [3]
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According to Rechtin and Levis, “it is possible to derive several characteristics of
systems architects and the architectures they produce. The first is that an architecture is
needed only if the system is unprecedented and complex. Second the architect is driven
by the special needs of the customer and tends to develop the architecture in a top-down
manner.”[10] This is very useful for the DoD, in fact, because the needs, requirements, and
the organizational hierarchy of the DoD are unique. The third characteristic of a systems
architect and the architectures produced is that the task of the architect is to elicit those
needs and to produce a “description” that can demonstrate to the customer that the system
to be produced (in conformance with the architecture) will satisfy the customer’s wants
and needs. This means the architecture does not include the details of the final designs.
[10] The architecture is a design of what the system is supposed to accomplish versus how
the system will actually accomplish it; the architecture is a static model of the system.
If an executable architecture could be created from a static architecture then the architect
could show the user how the system is to accomplish its mission in a dynamic form.
2.3.1.2

Structured Analysis of Architectures.

An Architecture is defined

above as “the fundamental organization of a system embodied in its components, their
relationships to each other and to the environment and the principles guiding its design
and evolution.” So, what does this mean? It means an architecture is the views of
the components of a system on how they relate to one another and react with their
environment.

It is necessary to describe the components, of these views, that will

implement the system. The components include: the hardware, software, personnel,
and facilities that will comprise a system and perform the processes. [10, 228] These
architectural views can be different because people can view a system from different
perspectives. Such a pilot views his airplane differently than the engineer that designed it.
These views may be broken up into three types; a Functional, Physical, and
Technical view. These views can be presented in graphical, textual or tabular form.
Structured Analysis of architectures is the process of decomposing these views of a system
with the appropriate presentation of components.
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Using Structured Analysis in a basic systems engineering approach, an architecture
is composed of two constructs: the Functional Architecture (view) and the Physical
Architecture (view). According to Levis, “The Functional Architecture is a set of activities
or functions, arranged, in a specified partial order that, when activated, achieves a set
of requirements. Similarly, a Physical Architecture is a representation of the physical
resources, expressed as nodes that constitute the systems and their connectivity, expressed
in the form of links.” [10] The Technical Architecture View while not part of the Structured
Analysis approach is defined as the minimal set of rules governing the arrangement,
interaction and interdependence of system parts and elements. [10][6] The implementation of these views in the DoD will be covered in Section 2.3.2 Figure 2.12 below shows
Levis’ three phases of architecture development.

Figure 2.12

2.3.1.3

Dr. Levis’ Basic Architecture Design Process

History of DoDAF Development.

DoD realized the need for

common approach for describing architectures in the mid-1990s. Up to that time, the
individual Commands, Services, and Agencies traditionally described their architectures
using their own techniques, vocabularies, and presentation schemes. [6, 1-5]
2-35

In October 1995, the Deputy Secretary of Defense directed that a DoD-wide effort
be undertaken to define and develop better means and processes for ensuring that C4ISR
capabilities meet the needs of the warfighter. A C4ISR Integration Task Force (ITF) was
established in response to that direction. The Integrated Architectures Panel (IAP), one
of several panels established by the ITF, published the C4ISR Architecture Framework,
Version 1 on 7 June 1996. [6, 1-5]
The C4ISR Architecture Working Group was established in October 1996, to
continue the work of the IAP. Their effort resulted in the C4ISR Architecture Framework
Version 2.0, dated 18 December 1997. In February 1998, the Architecture Coordination Council made up of the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology
(USD[A&T]), the Assistant Undersecretary of Defense for Command , Control,
Communication and Intelligence, and the Joint Staff/J6, published a memorandum
mandating the use of Version 2 for all C4ISR architecture descriptions. [6, 1-6]
Due to the fact that DoD Policy encouraged the use of Architectures, the C4ISR
Architecture Framework Version 2 was transformed into the DoDAF in 2003.

To

accomplish this evolution the Architecture Framework Working Group (AFWG) was
established by the DoD Chief Information Officer. The AFWG placed under the direction
of the Director of Architectures and Interoperability. The working group was composed
of representatives of the Joint Staff, Military Services, and other DoD components. [6,
1-6]
2.3.2

DoDAF Views and Products.

As discussed before architectures can be

presented in three views, a Functional, Physical, and Technical view. However, in the
DoDAF, the Functional view is called the Operational View and the Physical View is
referred to as the Systems View. The DoDAF defines a standard set of products for the
definition of an integrated architecture. It begins by defining three views, each of which
contains a number of products: the Operational View (OV), Systems View (SV), and the
Technical Standards View (TV). [6, 1-2] Additionally, the All- View (AV) set of products
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captures overarching aspects that set the scope and context of the architecture. [6, 1-3]
Table 2.10 briefly describes the 26 products, which are defined in the DoDAF.
The OV consists of nine products, which collectively describe, “the tasks and
activities, operational elements, and information required to accomplish DoD missions.”
The SV is a set of 13 “graphical and textual products that describes systems and interconnections providing for, or supporting, DoD functions.” The SV products assign systems to
perform the functions laid out in the OV products. Finally, the two TV products describe
“the minimal set of rules governing the arrangement, interaction, and interdependence of
systems parts or elements.” [6, 1-3] Typically, the TV products specify industry or other
technical standards as well as adopted conventions and rules that govern the communication between the systems described in the SV products.
Given these product definitions, an integrated architecture is an architecture
description in which the “data elements defined in one view are the same as architecture
data elements referenced in another view.” In other words, the architecture products of
an integrated architecture display the property of concordance, such that there is direct
traceability from data elements in OV products to SV products, and from SV products to
TV products. Figure 2.13 illustrates the traceability between products. Chapter 7 of the
DoDAF goes into more detail on how data elements from one product may relate to other
products.
Not all 26 products are required to form an integrated architecture. DoDAF Vol 1,
defines the minimum set as: AV-1, AV-2, OV-2, OV-3, OV-5, SV-1, and TV-1. Further
products should be developed as the intended use of the architecture requires. The key is
that the architecture be specified at a level of granularity appropriate to the complexity of
the system and the intended use of the architecture.
2.3.2.1

Product Descriptions.

As previously discussed, integrated

architectures encompass products from all three views. Certain architecture products from
each view are more essential than others, particularly in the discussion of the ATO Cycle.
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Table 2.10

Architecture Products Description [6, 2-4]

The OV-5, OV-6a, OV-6b, and OV-7 products will be covered in more detail because
these are the products that were utilized to create our CPN for the ATO Cycle. All the
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Figure 2.13

Linkages Between DoDAF Views [7, 2-1]

architecture products generated, using the DoDAF, for the ATO Cycle, can be seen in
APPENDIX B. From this point on, when the word architecture is used it will be referring
to integrated architectures.
There are two AV products, the Overview and Summary Information (AV-1) and the
Integrated Dictionary (AV-2). The AV-1, “provides executive-level summary information
in a consistent form that allows quick reference and comparison among architectures.”
[7, 3-1] The AV-1 has two purposes. In the initial phases of developing architecture
products for a system; the AV-1 serves as a planning guide that identifies the need for the
architecture, the viewpoint from which the architecture is developed and the context. The
context can include such things as mission, doctrine, relevant goals, and vision statements,
concept of operations, scenarios, and information assurance. [7, 3-10] The second purpose
of the AV-1 is to provide summary textual information concerning the architecture upon
completion. [7, 3-1]
The AV-2 is the integrated dictionary and is sometimes referred to as the data
dictionary. Like a dictionary, the AV-2 defines all architectural elements and common
terms to prevent misconceptions. The architecture data in the products with graphical
representations consists of each labeled item.
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These labeled items include ICOMS

(Inputs, Controls, Outputs, and Mechanisms), Entities, Activities, and Transitions. The
products with textual descriptions also have labeled items that are listed in the AV-2.
[7, 3-9] Architects should use standard terms or vocabulary. Often in the DoD specific
communities have their own vocabulary that may be used differently in other operational
communities. Take for example, “the use of the term track refers to very different concepts
in the carrier battle group community than in the mine-sweeper community. Yet both of
these communities are Navy operational groups and may participate together in littoral
warfare task forces.” [7, 3-11]
The High Level Operational Concept Graphic or OV-1 is simply a graphic that
represents a Concept of Operations.

This graphic is often just a presentation slide

illustrating what the architecture is supposed to do, and how it is supposed to do it. [7,
4-1]
The OV-2 is the Operational Node Connectivity Description Diagram. The OV-2
graphically depicts the exchange of information between nodes using a needline. Nodes
can be both internal and external to a system. The DoDAF defines a node as, “the element
of the operational architecture that produces, consumes, or processes information” and a
need line, “documents the requirement to exchange information.” [7, 4-7] The need line
does not indicate how the information exchange is accomplished just that it needs to be
done. Just to note a single need line in an OV may imply multiple forms of communications. Information exchanges and their modes of transfer will be covered more in depth
in the Communication Theory section.
The Operational Information Exchange Matrix (OV-3) identifies, “who exchanges
what information, with whom, why the information is necessary, and how the information
exchange occur.” [7, 4-16] The OV-3 is the ideal product for the scope of out project
however, the current OV-3 products available for the AOC are not detailed enough. This
will be covered in more detail in the AOC architecture section and the Communication
Theory section.
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The Organizational Relationship Chart (OV-4), is simply an organizational chart
often presented in a hierarchical tree format. The OV-4 can illustrate the relationships
among organizations or resources in an architecture. These relationships can include
command and control relationships, command-subordinate relationships, and coordination
relationships between equals. [7, 4-27]
The Operational Activity Diagram (OV-5), describes the activities or functions that
occur in a system. The OV-5, “describes capabilities, operational activities (or tasks),
input and output (I/O) flows between activities, and the I/O flows to/from activities that
are outside the scope of the architecture.” [7, 4-31] The OV-5 is often created by using the
Integration Definition for Function Modeling (IDEF0).
In IDEF0, a function is a transformation that turns inputs into outputs. Inputs to
be transformed into outputs enter a “function box” from the left, controls that guide the
transformation process enter the top, mechanisms (physical resources that perform the
function) enter the bottom, and outputs leave the right. [12, 67] IDEF0 uses ICOM
arrows to represent the Inputs, Controls, Outputs, and Mechanisms. DoDAF suggests
that controls should represent Doctrine, while mechanisms should represent organizations
or operational nodes.
Like many of the diagrams in the DoDAF, the OV-5 can be decomposed. For
example, “the top level activity (called A0 in IDEF0) alone would make up the “context
diagram.” It may then be decomposed into three lower level (or “detailed level”) activities,
A1, A2, and A3, which are depicted in another diagram. A1, A2, and A3 are a decomposition of A0. Figure 2.14 shows a decomposed IDEF0 diagram; inputs come in from the
right (I1, I2), outputs exit from the left (O1, O2, O3), controls come in from the top (C1,
C2, C3), and mechanisms come in from the bottom (M1).
The decomposition levels of the OV-5 should be aligned with the operational nodes
that are responsible for conducting the operational activities represented in the OV-2. [7,
4-33] In the case of this study, the OV-5 was decomposed to the level of the operational
divisions in the AOC. This will be covered more in depth in Section 2.5.1.
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Figure 2.14

Functional Decomposition in IDEF0 [12, 71]

DoDAF refers to the OV-6 as the Operational Activity Sequence and Timing
Descriptions. The OV-6 is broken up in to three separate descriptions.
• The Operational Rules Model (OV-6a)
• Operational State Transition Diagram (OV-6b)
• Operational Event-Trace Description (OV-6c)
The OV-6 products model the dynamic behavior of an operational system. Where
the previous OV products modeled the “static architecture” of the system, the OV-6
products are concerned with the timing and sequencing of the events of the activities in
the OV-5. [7, 4-43]

2-42

The OV-6a uses Logical Rules, such as IF-THEN-ELSE statements, to define or
constrain some aspect of an activity. “These rules might prescribe the specific set of
inputs required to produce a given output.” [7, 4-45] For example, in the ATO cycle
before the Combat Plans Division can produce the Joint Integrated Prioritized Targeting
List (JIPTL), they must receive guidance from Air Operations Directive (AOD) and Battle
Damage Assessment from the previous day’s missions.
The OV-6b is a graphical method of describing how an operational node or activity
responds to various events by changing its state. The DoDAF states, “The (OV-6b) relates
states, events, and actions. A state and its associated action(s) specify the response of an
operational activity to events. When an event occurs, the next state may vary depending on
the current state (and its associated event), the event, and the rule set or guard conditions.
A change of state is called a transition. Each transition specifies the response based on a
specific event and the current state. Actions may be associated with a given state or with
the transitions between states.” [7, 4-50]
Figure 2.15 shows an example of a state transition diagram. The figure is taken
from presentation slides created by Dr. Levis. The example is of the possible states of a
defensive counter air patrol mission.
The Operational Event Trace Description (OV-6c) allows the tracing of actions in a
particular scenario or critical sequence of events of an operational thread. [7, 4-55] The
OV-6c is often referred to as the sequence diagram in the Unified Modeling Language
(UML).
The Logical Data Model (OV-7) is the final OV product. The OV-7, “defines the
architectures domain’s system data types (or entities) and the relationships among the
system data types.” [7, 4-62] The DoDAF continues to state, “The OV-7 defines each
kind of system data type associated with the architecture domain, mission, or business,
as its own entity, with its associated attributes and relationships. These entity definitions
correlate to OV-3 information elements and OV-5 inputs, outputs, and controls”
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Figure 2.15

High Level State Transition Diagram

The OV-7 can be modeled with either the Integrated Definition for Data modeling
or in UML where it is referred to as a Class Diagram. Figure 2.16 from DODAF shows an
Example.
The 13 Systems Views (SV) products is a set of, “graphical and textual products
that describes systems and interconnections providing for, or supporting, DoD functions.”
[7, 5-1] The SV products assign systems to perform the functions laid out in the OV
products. Only the SV-1, SV-4, and SV-5 will be covered here. For more information, see
the DoDAF.
The Systems Interface Description (SV-1), “depicts systems nodes and the systems
resident at these nodes to support organizations/human roles represented by operational
nodes of the Operational Node Connectivity Description (OV-2).” ([7, 5-1] The SV-1
links the OV and SV products by showing the system nodes that support the operational
nodes.
The Systems Functionality Description (SV-4), “describes system functions and the
flow of system data among system functions.” [7, 5-25] There is a correlation between the
OV-5 and SV-4. However, there may not be a one-to-one mapping of system functions to
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Figure 2.16

OV-7 as a UML Class Diagram [7, 4-63]

operational functions. This mapping is done in the SV-5. The Data Flow Diagram (DFD)
is often the tool of choice to represent the SV-4. Figure 2.17 shows an example of a DFD.
The Operational Activity to systems Function Traceability Matrix (SV-5), “depicts
the mapping of operational activities to system functions and this identifies the transformation of an operational need into a purposeful action performed by a system.” [7, 5-35]
In other words, the SV-5 shows what systems are used and how they are linked together
to perform an activity by a particular organization. An example of this would be how
the combat plans division, in the AOC, uses the Combat Target Planning System and
the electronic Joint Munitions Effectiveness Manual to evaluate the desired effects of a
weapon against a particular target. The DoDAF also says, “The relationship between
operational activities and system functions can also be expected to be many-to-many (i.e.,
one operational activity may be supported by multiple system functions, and one system
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Figure 2.17

SV-4 as a Data Flow Diagram [7, 5-26]

function may support multiple operational activities)”. [7, 5-35] The SV-5 of the AOC
ATO cycle can be seen in APPENDIX B .
The Technical Views consist of two products. The TV, “provide the technical
systems-implementation standards upon which engineering specifications are based,
common building blocks are established, and product lines are developed.” [7, 6-1]
The Technical Standards Profile (TV-1), “is a collection of standards that are
relevant to the architecture. For military systems, the Joint Technical Architecture (JTA)
is often cited in the TV-1.” [29, 29] The DoDAF states, “The standards are referenced as
relationships to the systems, systems functions, system data, hardware/software items or
communications protocols in the SV-1, SV-2, SV-4, SV-6, OV-7 and SV-11 products.” [7,
6-20]
The Technical Standards Forecast (TV-2) lists how expected standards in the TV-1
product are likely to change in the future.
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2.3.3

DoDAF Architecture Description Process.

While not mandated by the

DoDAF, the Vol 3 Deskbook discusses a six-step step process to build the architecture
descriptions and how to use architectures. Figure 2.18 depicts the six-step process. This
six-step process is a generic process and the DoDAF suggests that specific organizations
should tailor the process to their needs and purpose. The six-steps to the DoDAF’s Generic
process are listed below. [6, 5-4]
1. Determine the intended use of the Architecture
2. Determine the architecture description’s scope, context, environment, and any other
assumptions to be considered.
3. Based on the intended use and scope, determine what information the architecture
description needs to capture.
4. Determine products to be built
5. Gather the architecture data and build the requisite products.
6. Use the architecture description for the intended purpose.
The architecture descriptions should have been built in mind for a specific purpose,
that being either to support investment decisions, requirements identification, system
acquisition, interoperability evaluation, operations assessment, or other purposes. [6, 5-6]
The DoDAF states, “The architecture descriptions facilitate and enable these purposes but
does not provide conclusions or answers. For that, human and possibly automated analysis
must be applied.” [6, 5-6] It is the hope of this group that the research conducted with
CPN and ARENA on the ATO cycle will help to develop automated analysis techniques
for architectures in other organizations for the DoD.
2.3.4

DoDAF Uses.

The DoDAF and the use of integrated architectures will

be key elements of the Department of Defense’s transition from a threat-based force
to a capability-based force.

[6, 3-1] The DoD has made a long-term commitment

to the development and maintenance of integrated architectures to both document
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Figure 2.18

The Six Step DoDAF Architecture Development Process [6, 5-5]

current capabilities and to define requirements for future capabilities. The central role
architectures are to play in all DoD acquisitions is highlighted by their central placement
in the Acquisition Process defined in DODI 5000.2 shown in Figure 2.19. As these
architectures become more robust and widespread they will absorb existing Capstone
Requirements Documents. [5, 3]
DoDAF architecture products will be used for a variety of decision-making circumstances, ranging from capability analysis to operational planning to investment decision
making. Each of the users has specific areas of interest, and if they are developing the
architecture, they will focus on their areas of expertise. Ideally, a single fully specified
integrated architecture will be used by all interested parties, with each extracting the data
elements relevant to the decision they must make. Figure 2.20 represents a sample of
potential uses for integrated architectures depending on the decision maker.
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Figure 2.19

DoDI 5000.2 Acquisition Process [4, 3]

As DoDAF states, “as DoD enters into an era of Net-Centric Operations and
Warfare, the ability to portray and understand complex many-to-many relationships
becomes even more important.” Architectures are a key tool in portraying and managing
this growing complexity. One of the most promising is the potential to combine an
integrated architecture with modeling and simulation tools in order to form an “executable
architecture.” It is possible “to show complex, dynamic organizational interactions that
cannot be identified or properly understood using static models.” [6, 4-50] This approach
is strongly advocated by Dr. Levis. He notes, however, that the current DoDAF lacks
guidance as to how executable architectures are to be developed. This Thesis attempts to
answer this question and will be covered in more detail in section 2.4.
2.3.5

AOC Architecture.

General Jumper (at that time Commander, Air Combat

Command, now Chief of Staff, United States Air Force) declared that the AOC should be
treated as a weapons system. This was in an effort to combat the ad-hoc nature of the
AOC. Before this declaration, each theater command (i.e. PACAF, USAFE, CENTAF)
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Figure 2.20

Value of Architectures to Different Communities [6, 3-8]

would build their own AOCs. Each individual command or organization would create
and manage their own AOCs according to various local methods and designs. The first
attempt to create an architecture for AOC weapon system was designated the Air Force
Aerospace Operations Center Weapon System AN/USQ-163, Falconer Architecture,
Block 10.1. (Short Name: AOC WS 10.1 Architecture) The Air Force contracted the
MITRE Corporation of Hampton, Virginia to architect a baseline architecture for the AOC.
According to Zinn, the AV-1 of the first 10.1 architecture release states, “the reference
material for the architecture exists as a collection of mostly unrelated heaps of PowerPoint
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briefings, documents, and emails. It is inconsistent, sparse in many areas, out of date,
uneven in fidelity, or in some cases non-existent.” [29, 37]
The AOC WS 10.1 Architecture that was used for our study was released by MITRE
January 11, 2004. According to the AV-1, “this architecture reflects baseline portions of
the Al-Udeid Air Base (AUAB) AOC, and incorporates changes approved by the AOC
WS Configuration Control Board.” This release provided a section that related the ATO
cycle to the OV-5. This section proved to be extremely helpful in creating our architecture
products for the AOC conducting the ATO cycle. These products can be seen in Appendix
B and the process used to create them will be covered in more detail in the Chapter 3.
It is worth mentioning here that the “baseline” AOC-WS is still changing.
According to Norman, “the AOC built and stood-up at AUAB was declared to be the
first instance of the AOC Weapon System, and its configuration was set as the baseline.”
[20] However, to meet the demands of the warfighter and to incorporate new systems
alterations to the baseline at AUAB, modifications have occurred unabated. [20, 3] The
AV-1 from the current MITRE architecture also states, “This architecture will continue to
evolve. Currently, it reflects the architecture as we believe it exists currently and in the
near future (FY04-FY06) to reflect systems already in development and that are expected
to be fielded in that timeframe.” Needless to say, one of our disclaimers to this project is
that our study to create an executable architecture for the ATO cycle should be taken as
purely academic. The conclusion and recommendations section will note how efforts to
create executable architectures in the future can be more accurate and useful.
As stated in the DoDAF, “Most graphical architecture products (e.g., OV-2, OV-5,
SV-1 and SV-4) permit the modeling or their respective architecture data elements using
decomposition (i.e., several diagrams of the same product may be developed for the same
architecture, where each diagram shows an increasing level of detail). In general, the
level of usable detail increases as the perspective changes from that of the planner, to the
owner, to the designer, to the builder.” Figure 2.21 shows some of the rules of thumb for
decomposition rules.
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Figure 2.21

Rules of Thumb for Decomposition [7, 2-9]

In our study, the architectures we created for the ATO cycle were decomposed to
the functions performed by the divisions. We decided on this level of the decomposition
because the processes performed by the divisions were more eloquently represented in the
MITRE architecture.

2.4

Executable Architectures
2.4.1

Colored Petri Nets.

In an effort to quantify the distributed architecture

design options, we created an executable architecture with a Colored Petri Net (CPN).
Petri nets are a formal, graphical technique used to model a discrete-event system. While
graphical, they can express a system mathematically as well and can be used to verify
a system. Distributions can be added to perform statistical analysis on a system. Using
timing, performance characteristics can be measured. Their flexibility gives them a great
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deal of power as an executable architecture. Their visual nature makes them intuitive and
relatively easy to understand.
Petri nets were introduced by Dr. Carl Adam Petri in his PhD dissertation at Bonn,
Germany in 1962. They were quickly recognized as a powerful modeling tool, especially
for modeling concurrent processes. In the 1970s, high level Petri nets, including colored
Petri nets, were developed and in the late 1980s hierarchical nets were born. Somewhere
in that time Petri nets had been spread throughout Europe and are used there extensively.
While some American universities have become involved with Petri nets, Petri nets’
influence has been minor in the U.S.
When working with CPNs, you need only remember the four basic elements to
colored Petri nets: places, transitions, directed arcs and tokens. All four of these elements
are present in Figure 2.22 below.

Figure 2.22

Basic Colored Petri Net

A place is always represented by a circle or ellipse. In CPN Tools (version 1.2.0),
a place has three locations for inscriptions. The first is the place name which is shown
inside of the ellipse. The second is the color type and is typically shown below and to the
right of the place. The last inscription is the initial value which is shown above and to the
right of the place. This allows the user to predefine the initial state of the CPN by defining
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any tokens that the place may hold before execution. A place can model an object and can
hold one or more tokens which contain data associated with the object.
These tokens can be given different “colors” or attributes that make them excellent
for passing information between objects. In CPN Tools there are 4 basic color types:
STRING, INT, E, and BOOL. The STRING type is a string of characters; INT is an
integer (0, 1, 2, 3, ); E is an enumerated type where the modeler defines the possible
values; BOOL can be true or false. A place may also have a color corresponding to any
color type or product of color types.
The information (token) goes from a place to a transition and from a transition to a
place. A transition is modeled as a rectangle and can transmit, modify, destroy, or create
new tokens. This makes token placement a non-trivial part of the model creation. A
designer must decide if the token will start in a place or if it will be created in a transition.
Likewise, a token can end in a place or be destroyed by a transition. Either way, a token
will be in a place at some time in its existence and it will reach a transition at some time.
The transition is used as the processing center for a CPN and has logic associated with it.
This is where all of the work occurs.
Like places, transitions have inscriptions. The first is located in the center of the
transition and is its name. Second is the guard which is contained in brackets ([]) and set
the rules for when a transition will “fire” (process the tokens). The third inscription is
the time delay associated with the modeled processing time of the transition. Finally, a
code segment can be added to the transition. This code segment is where all of the “work”
can be done to the tokens. Information can be created or used by creating or destroying
tokens; randomness can be inserted; conditional logic can be used to make decisions.
The pathway followed by the tokens is an arc which can have logic that controls the
flow of the tokens. This logic is in the form of conditional “if” statements that can change
the contents of the tokens and even destroy tokens. The arc can have exactly one origin
and exactly one destination, but tokens can travel both directions on an arc, depending on
the directionality of the arc.
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The model in figure 2.23 is rather simple and easy to view in a single page. Since
one of the strengths of CPNs is the ability to visually inspect the model, a large model
would nullify this if not for abstraction. Transitions can be replaced by sub pages that
allow the details to be hidden, yet still accessible. This CPN is actually hierarchical. The
“Create CPN” transition in figure 2.23 has a sub page that has the logic for this CPN. If
you open this sub page, you will find figure 2.24.

Figure 2.23

A Simple Hierarchical CPN

On this sub page all of the logic involving the process to create CPNs is visible.
The first transition (“Develop Static Architecture”) will take the token located in the
place labeled “Requirements” and create architecture products (“OV5”, “OV6a”, “OV7”,
“OV6b”) which are modeled as places. The initial token starts at the “Requirements” place
and will be destroyed in the “Develop Static Architecture” transition. All other tokens are
created in transitions.
This model has some useful features. If you wished to see how fast you could
produce a CPN, you can add timing to the model. Timing can be used to optimize your
CPN creation processes. If you are looking for useless steps in your CPN creation process,
a state space analysis can identify them.
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Figure 2.24

CPN Sub Page

Some things are harder to model. We found the concept of quality to be less
than ideally applicable inside the model. For example, if incoming information is of
questionable value, how do you model its quality and how will that quality affect a
transition? This concept was important to the model we created, and continues to be
an area of research scarcely documented.
2.4.2

CPN Development and Traceability.

on the creation of static architectures.

The DoDAF goes into great detail

It even shows more than one approach by

demonstrating how an object-oriented architecture can be created. It is amazingly quiet
about executable architectures. Although it recognizes their importance, little content is
delivered. As a result, there are many professional products available to create executable
architectures, but no DoD guidance or standardization procedures to follow in using them.
The DoDAF is an integrated approach and we feel it’s essential to keep that continuity
through the executable architecture as well.
In the construction of our executable model, we relied heavily on a paper coauthored by Dr. Levis, “C4ISR Architectures: II. A Structured Analysis Approach for
Architecture Design.” [19] This paper has key information on how to convert a C4ISR
architecture into an executable architecture using Petri nets by mapping elements within
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views to CPN model components. We will give an abbreviated version of the process
shown in Figure 2.25 here. The static architecture products needed to build and analyze a
CPN are the OV-5, OV-6a, OV-6b, and OV-7. The OV-6b is used in the analysis while the
other three are used to construct the CPN.

Figure 2.25

Developing an Executable Architecture from a Static Architecture

The places on the Petri model come from ICOMs off the OV-5. The activities from
the OV-5 become transitions in the model. The arcs, then, are just ties between the two
that follows the same flow as that of the OV-5. This part is so simple and straight forward
that it could easily be automated. The hierarchy of the CPN will match that of the OV-5
where decomposed activities correspond to substitute transitions representing sub pages
of the CPN. The CPN top level in Figure 2.25 corresponds with the OV-5 context diagram.
Creating tokens is where the fun begins. The tokens themselves can come straight
out of the OV-7 (Logical Data Model). However, where and how they are placed is not
always straight-forward. A token is assigned from the attribute of an OV-7 entity. This
entity corresponds to an ICOM on the OV-5 which in turn corresponds to a place in the
2-57

model. Therefore, the token resides (at some time) in the corresponding place. If the same
attribute is found in many different entities in the OV-7, you should expect to see it flow
between many places on the model. Tokens that exist in only one entity on the OV-7 would
be expected to be found in only that corresponding place. Deciding where a token will
begin and where it will end (places vs transitions) is not as straight-forward as building
the structure.
In a CPN, tokens have “colors” as well. These colors are derived from the OV-7.
The OV-7 attributes have types (integer, string, etc.). These types can be put together to
form the token’s color. The token in our example is (“Sponsor”, “Task”). These attributes
from the OV-7 are both strings so the color is “STRING*STRING.”
For a transition to fire, the “guard” rules must be satisfied. These guards are derived
from the rules of the OV-6a. The logic on the arcs is taken from the same view. In DoDAF,
these rules show how information is passed through the system, and they do the same for
the CPN model.
The last architecture product is the OV-6b. This is not used in the construction of the
CPN, but is used to verify the model. A state space analysis is made with CPN Tools that
shows how many states can never be reached (dead states), how many states can never be
left (infinite occurrence sequences), how many nodes there are, and how many transitions
there are. All of this should match the OV-6b. Obviously, this means there should be no
dead states or infinite occurrence sequences.
2.4.3

Arena.

Colored Petri Nets are just one example of executable

architectures. Since CPNs are really just a modeling tool, we identified another modeling
tool that could also be used to provide insight into static architectures. Arena has strengths
that give it some advantages over CPN Tools. Arena’s primary strength lies in its ability
to rapidly run multiple replications of a variety of model configurations in a batch mode.
This type of Monte Carlo simulation analysis is extremely useful in identifying critical
parameter values and other important configurations aspects.
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Arena is a general purpose, visual simulation tool marketed by the Rockwell
Corporation. It provides a hierarchical system of modules which represent common
simulation constructs. At the top end of the hierarchy are templates of common practices
which are constructed of numerous modules. At the most detailed level, user-written
functions in general purpose programming languages such as Visual Basic or C/C++ are
allowed. This allows for the rapid development of customizable simulation models for
a variety of different analysis applications. The reader is referred to the Arena product
documentation [2] for a complete description of the product. Here we offer a brief
summary of the key Arena components utilized in this thesis.
An Arena model typically exists of several basic components, organized to model
the process of interest to the user. The components, or blocks, are connected together
to represent a flow which reflects the operation of the system of interest. Entities are
those items which will flow through your simulation model. They may represent items
of raw material, pieces of data, customers, or any other dynamic object of the simulation.
[27, 24] Entities possess common attributes which are used to describe them, and whose
values are unique to each instance of the entity within the system. If, for example, your
entities are customers, then some attributes may be account numbers, contact information,
or order histories. The values of these attributes may be set or modified as the simulation
progresses through the use of assign blocks. Entities are created by create blocks in order
to represent their entry into the system being simulated and disposed of by dispose blocks
to represent their exit from the system.
The next common element to an Arena model is a resource. Resources represent
those scarce items which entities require in order to progress through the model (similar
to OV-5 mechanisms). Returning to our example where entities represent customers, a
common resource might be tellers or other service personnel required in order to service
the customers. Each entity will seize the number and type of resources it requires and
then release them when it is finished. If the required number or type of resources is not
available, the entity will be forced to wait until they are.
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Processes are the next important element of an Arena model. A process typically
represents the interaction between entities and resources. Though there are several types of
processes offered by Arena, the most commonly used in the seize-delay-release process.
This implements the procedure described above in which an entity seizes one or more
resources, delays for an arbitrary amount of time, and then releases the resource(s) and
exits the process. The length of the delay may be a constant, or it may be a random
variable drawn from any of a number of common statistical distributions. If an entity
enters a process and the appropriate number or type of resources is not available, the
entity will enter a queue and wait until such time as they are.
Many systems can be simulated to a high degree of sophistication using only the
elements described thus far. The Arena model used in this thesis, which will be described
in detail in Chapter 3, used only a few more. Chief among these are the hold and signal
blocks. A hold block does just what the name implies, it holds any entity which enters
it until it either receives a signal, or detects that a certain condition exists. Signal blocks
provide the impetus for hold blocks to release one or more of their entities. These blocks
work in unison to control the flow of entities through the system.
Another pair of blocks which work together are the batch and separate blocks.
Batch blocks combine multiple entities together into one entity which then proceeds
through the system. Correspondingly, separate blocks split existing batches apart so that
the individual entities may then pursue their own courses through the system. Finally,
separate blocks are often followed by decide blocks which can direct entities down one
of multiple possible paths. A decide block may make its decision based on a certain
condition, such as the value of an attribute, or based on a certain probability assigned to
each potential path.
While a model is running, Arena automatically gathers a variety of statistics on the
behavior of the system. Average waiting times, queue lengths, and resource utilization
rates are all gathered automatically. Additional statistics can be captured using record
blocks, and data such as attribute values can be written to external files using read/write
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blocks. In a typical Arena model run, a number of replications, or independent executions
of the model will be run. Arena gathers all of these statistics across the replications, and
reports average values along with % confidence intervals.
A small example may be useful in demonstrating the basic function of an Arena
model. In our example system shown in Figure 2.26, students will arrive for a field trip
to a museum. A limited number of buses are available to transport students. Once at the
museum, a limited number of ticket agents are available to issue tickets to the students
prior to their entering the museum.

Figure 2.26

A Sample Arena Model of School Field Trips

The block in the upper left-hand corner of the figure labeled “Students arrive” is a
create block. This create block utilizes a Poisson distribution to determine the interval
between the arrival of individual students, which are one of our entity types. A second
create block labeled “Create phantom riders for return trip” begins a parallel track below.
This creates a large number of “phantom” riders at the very beginning of the simulation.
These entities obviously are not present in the physical system, but are used to make our
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simulation behave more realistically. As soon as these phantom riders are created, they go
into a hold block, where they wait for a signal.
Returning to the top track, we find the batch block labeled “Form Field Trip.” It
groups individual students into batches of 25. Once this number of individual students has
arrived, a single entity representing the group will be allowed to proceed. This batch will
then arrive at the “Ride bus to museum” process block. This process seizes one resource
of type bus for an amount of time drawn randomly from a normal distribution which has
been constructed to accurately represent the transit time to the museum.
Once this amount of time has elapsed, the batched entity will exit the process block
and enter the signal block labeled “Bus is ready to return.” This will send a signal
to the hold block (mentioned above) instructing it to release one of the phantom rider
entities. This entity will then enter the “Ride bus back” process block. This will seize
the bus resource which was just released when the batched students exited the “Ride
bus to museum” process block, holding it for an amount of time representing the bus’s
return trip. Upon exiting this block, and thus freeing the bus resource for another trip, the
phantom rider entity will be disposed. Simultaneously, the entity representing the batch
of 25 students will enter the “Line students up” separate block, which will split the batch
up into its 25 constituent student entities. Each of these entities will enter the “Purchase
museum tickets” process blocks, where they will seize one of five available ticket agent
resources. If all five ticket agents are busy, the remaining students will queue until an
agent is available. Finally, the student entities exit the system by entering the dispose
block labeled “Enter museum”.
This simple model can be executed to predict such statistics as the utilization rate of
the buses and ticket agents, or the average wait time of students. By varying the number
of ticket agents, buses, or student batch size, the overall effect on these statistics can be
investigated. This is such a common application of Arena models that a utility is included
with the system known as the Arena Process Analyzer, or PAN. PAN allows the user to
designate a range of values for variables within an Arena simulation, such as the number of
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resources available or the parameters defining a delay distribution. Multiple replications
can then be run at each of the design points and the corresponding statistics gathered.
The appropriate variables are automatically adjusted between runs without any further
intervention required from the user.
In order to run PAN, the user must first define a number of scenarios. A scenario
consists of specifying values for the controls, such as variable or parameter settings, and
determining which responses you wish to observe. Figure 2.27 below shows the PAN
interface with a sample set of scenarios defined.

Figure 2.27

A Sample PAN Configuration for School Field Trips

In this PAN example, five scenarios (system configurations) have been defined. First
among these is the baseline configuration of the system, which will be the basis for all
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comparisons. The remaining four scenarios implement differing values for the number of
buses and ticket agents at the museum. These are shown in the relevant columns under the
Controls section of each scenario line. Further scenarios could be defined if so desired.
For each scenario, data will be gathered on the waiting time to form a field trip, the amount
of time students spend waiting, and the utilization rate of the school buses. These can be
seen in the Responses section of the scenario definitions.
Once these scenarios have been designed, the user can simply direct PAN to run
and it will execute the number of replications defined in the original model for each of the
scenarios. PAN will automatically adjust the values of the relevant control and gather data
on the specified responses and report these back to the user. The whole process runs in a
batch mode with no user intervention required between scenarios.
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III. Methodology
3.1

Scope and Assumptions
3.1.1

Scope.

In order to attenuate the complexity of the Air Operation Center,

and even the air tasking cycle, the process must be adequately scoped. For this research,
the focus lies on the first four phases of the air tasking cycle which pertain to the
development and dissemination of the ATO. Scoping to this level, there are only a few
logical configurations to test. As previously mentioned, the impact of moving a complete
division to another geographic location will be analyzed. The Intelligence, Surveillance,
and Reconnaissance Division (ISRD) and Combat Operations Division (COD) are not
going to be relocated for this study. As previously described, the ISRD has nested
components in all of the other divisions. It will be assumed that the components that
are nested in the Strategy Division (SD), Combat Plans Division (CPD), and Air Mobility
Division (AMD) will remain nested as those divisions are relocated. The COD is solely
involved in the fifth phase of the air tasking cycle, or the force execution phase. This is
outside of the focus of the ATO development and dissemination. Nonetheless, it would not
be logical to take the division responsible for last minute ATO revisions and monitoring
joint force execution away from the fight.
The remaining divisions that will be relocated are the Strategy Division, Combat
Plans Division, and Air Mobility Division. Four configurations were developed and tested.
The first was to allow all divisions to be forward deployed. This created a baseline for how
business is done today. The three other configurations involved relocating one or more
divisions. The rationale for moving divisions for the other three configurations has been
provided below.
Through discussions with Major Paul Lambertson, former Chief of C-17 Tactics in
the CAOC, it would seem logical to examine relocating the AMD to the Tanker/Airlift
Control Center (TACC). The relocation is validated by the available support of the TACC,
since the Air Mobility Element is deployed as a liaison element of the AMC TACC. The
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functionality of the TACC could be modified in order to accommodate the communication
needs to support the AMD mission. This would require two communication nodes, one at
the forward deployed AOC and one at the TACC.
The third configuration is based upon the footprint of the AOC as well as the phases
in which the divisions are involved. This configuration is based upon moving the SD
and CPD to a common reachback location. This would also only require two communication nodes, one at the forward deployed AOC and one at the reachback location. In
examining the notional floor plan of the AOC as shown in Figures 3.1 and 3.2, it can be
seen that the SD and CPD are self contained divisions. It would be fairly easy to move
these divisions out of the floor plan without significantly effecting neighboring flows of
information. Also, recalling the organizational involvement in the air tasking cycle, the
SD and CPD are both involved in the early target development phase.

Figure 3.1

Notional Strategy Division Floor Plan
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Figure 3.2

Notional Combat Plans Division Floor Plan

The last configuration combines the second and third options. This would mean that
the AMD is located at the TACC and the SD and CPD are located at the same reachback
location. The COD and ISRD would be forward deployed along with the JFACC/JFC
and other mission essential leadership personnel. This configuration is complicated by
requiring three nodes to be in constant communication.
These four communication configurations can be improved, and more configurations can be added, if the divisions are decomposed to the team level. Such an effort
would increase the complexity of the communications model exponentially. The configurations we used have been summarized in Table 3.1 below.
3.1.2

Assumptions.

There are a number of assumptions that were required to

model the AOC in the previously described configurations. These assumptions have been
enumerated below. Deviations from these assumptions will complicate the system and
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Table 3.1 Configuration Summary
Cofiguration
SD
CPD
AMD
1 (Baseline)
Deployed
Deployed Deployed
2
Deployed
Deployed
TACC
3
Reachback Reachback Deployed
4
Reachback Reachback
TACC
provide basis for further research. The impact of these assumptions will be discussed
throughout this chapter in the appropriate sections.
1. One ATO cycle modeled, instead of four simultaneous ATOs
2. The minimum (baseline) time to develop an ATO is the standard 72 hours
3. Delays will be from a discrete distribution
4. The number of communicating nodes will impact the range of the delay distribution
5. The preceding work of the past AFIT student group on grounding and communication mediums is a validated source for quantifiable MOEs
6. Time Sensitive Targets will not be involved in the Air Tasking Cycle
7. The Air Tasking Cycle is a perfectly linear cycle, i.e. there is no concurrent
processing
8. Revisions and feedback between divisions or teams would need to be modeled at a
lower level of abstraction
9. Organizational involvement will be at the division level

3.2

Static and Executable Architecture Development and Utilization Process
Many challenges were faced throughout the process of developing and employing

the executable architecture. A simple four step process was outlined for developing and
utilizing the executable process. This process is shown in Figure 3.3.
Each step had its own unexpected difficulties that could impact the direction of
the research and any subsequent steps. The first step was to develop the appropriate
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Figure 3.3

Model Development Process

architecture products required to build an executable architecture. Fortunately, there is
a wealth of information available on the AOC. The prominent sources are the Air Force
Operational Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (AFOTTP) manual, the Air Ground
Operation School, and MITRE (in support of ESC and AFC2ISRC). The problem with
having this extensive knowledge base is trying to reconcile the various perspectives of the
air tasking cycle. The AFOTTP is structured by organizations and present the process
throughout the responsibilities of the division. MITRE developed a suite of DoDAF
products to represent the complete AOC. The latest version release (increment 10.1) of the
architecture included the mapping between the complete AOC OV-5 and the Air Tasking
Cycle. This provided the necessary foundation to develop the three remaining products.
The second step involves transforming the OV-5, OV-6a, and OV-7 into an
executable architecture. Recall that the OV-6b is used for verification of the CPN’s
functionality. The process of transforming a static architecture is not a novel idea since the
methodology has been explicitly laid out by Dr. Levis as seen in Section 2.4.2. . However,
there is one colossal void in using this methodology for our intended purpose. The ability
to assess different AOC organizational configurations has not yet been attempted. This
required a new concept of introducing mechanisms from the OV-5 as resources in the
CPN. Mechanisms are not passed between activities in an OV-5. Similarly, they should
only be located in a single place in a CPN. The resource, or division in our situation, will
be required to fire a transition and then will be passed to its originating place. The resource
can have attributes that impact the processing that is done within the transition. We will
elaborate this concept later.
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The third step is the appropriate selection and implementation of MOEs. The
CPN that has been developed only contains the operational aspects of the air tasking
cycle. A MOE that would be influenced by split AOC operations needed to be carefully
selected and implemented. Originally, ATO quality was desired to be the MOE. We
quickly discovered that the area of quantifying quality is an ill-defined MOE. This is
an active area of research that was deemed outside of the intended goal of the thesis.
Next, implementing a MOE from a precursor Systems Engineering research group was
pursued. This previous group developed a matrix that described the capabilities of various
communication methods and the corresponding communication requirements of various
AOC processes. This “grounding” concept was discussed in Section 2.2. In order to use
the communication requirements matrix, each responsibility needed to be mapped back
to one or more transitions. The mapping would allow rules to be developed to determine
which transition did not meet communication requirements, and by how much. Such
a strategy would work if a more robust code segment was developed for CPN Tools.
Currently, only one “IF, THEN, ELSE” logical structure is permitted. The implementation of the rules within CPN Tools to track multiple MOEs is beyond the scope of our
research. Instead, the same requirements were preprocessed to be used as an input to
CPN Tools. Each configuration has a different number of missed requirements and could
be assessed a time delay in order to compensate. This resulted with time being the final
MOE. The details of incorporating time as the MOE will be discussed in Section 3.4.1.

3.3

AOC Architecture Products
As previously discussed, DoDAF Vol I defines the minimum set of products for an

integrated architecture as: AV-1, AV-2, OV-2, OV-3, OV-5, SV-1, and TV-1. Following
the methodology explained is Sec 2.4.2, the architecture products required to develop an
executable architecture are the OV-5, OV-6a, OV-6b, and OV-7. These will be the focus of
this section due to their direct impact on the executable architecture. While the remaining
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products in the minimum set are extremely important, they have little relevance on how to
develop an executable architecture.
The AOC Architecture is controlled by the MITRE Corporation. In this thesis, our
scope is the ATO production cycle, a subset of the operations of the AOC as a whole. The
best source for the ATO cycle is the AOC schoolhouse at Hurlburt Field. Unfortunately,
while the schoolhouse has drawn out and explained the ATO cycle in some detail, they
have not developed an architecture to go along with it. Fortunately, the new MITRE
architecture release maps their architecture to the schoolhouse ATO cycle. This allowed
us to use the MITRE architecture, thereby transferring the responsibility of verification
and validation to the experts. Therefore, our model is built from an architecture that the
Air Force accepts as the most accurate.
The last issue was to reduce the MITRE architecture to fit our scope. Using the
mapping provided by MITRE, we were able to create an ATO cycle architecture that agrees
fully with the official AOC architecture.
3.3.1

Operational Activity Diagram (OV-5).

The MITRE architecture OV-5

included more than we needed or wanted. As shown in Figure 3.4, the A0 level has
7 activity blocks of which we used just 5 and we only decomposed 3 of those. The 5
activities corresponded to the ATO cycle, but two of them had nothing to do with actually
creating the ATO. These were the Execution and Evaluation activities. The third of the
five MITRE activities (Task Available Capabilities/Forces) was split into two activities
in our architecture (Weaponeering and ATO production) to correspond with the Hurlburt
schoolhouse model of the ATO cycle.
The mapping tool that was included in the 10.1 release of the MITRE Architecture
is shown in Figure 3.5. The beauty of this tool is that it maps directly into the air tasking
cycle that is the focus of our model. The left side of the picture shows the air tasking cycle.
When one of the six steps are selected, the corresponding MITRE activities appear on the
right side of the figure. This tool was invaluable in creating our OV-5.
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Figure 3.4

MITRE OV-5 Diagram

Figure 3.5

ATO Cycle

The OV-5, after realigning it for our scope, is shown in Figure 3.6. Note that even
though all six steps are included in this OV-5, the emphasis remains on the first four steps
that lead to the production of the ATO. The remaining two steps of force execution and
assessment complete the cycle and would be potential areas for further research.
The MITRE architecture agrees with our ATO architecture at each level of
abstraction until it reaches the limit of our scope with the exception of A3.1, Develop
Weaponeering Solutions for Targets. Figure 3.7 shows MITRE’s A3.1 which has twelve
activities at this level, which violates the suggestion to limit the number of activities to
nine in order to maintain readability.
MITREs A3.1 was reduced to what is shown in Figure 3.8. This was done because
the first five activities had an identical output. In thinking ahead to the executable model,
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Figure 3.6

Reduced MITRE IDEF0

this would be equivalent to passing a token through multiple transitions without changing
any attributes. If the output can not be uniquely identified, the activity should be omitted.
We also combined the two activities that created target worksheets and target folders
as “Develop Target Solutions.” These modifications increased model coherency and
readability.
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Figure 3.7
3.3.2

MITRE’s Develop Weaponeering Solutions for Targets Decompositions
Rules Model (OV-6a).

The Rules Model contains the necessary

information to ensure that the CPN performs correctly while evaluating any MOEs. Rules
should be written at the appropriate level based on their intended use. For example, rules
for a mission level may consist of doctrine, guidance, and rules of engagement. Rules
are written as Structured English statements and Rules are generally implemented within
the transition in a CPN. Specifically, a rule can be implemented in the inscription on a
transition for a guard, time delay, or code segment. It is also possible to use arc inscriptions
to implement rules. For our MOE of time, all rules were implemented in the time delay
portion of transitions. Generally, the Structured English rules for timing our scenario
would follow the following form
IF configuration = 1 THEN delay = Missed Requirements * discrete(1,5)
The rule set for timing has been simplified to tabular form and shown in Table 3.2.
Table 3.2

Time Delay Rules

Each transition requires the appropriate divisions (per Section 2.1.3) to be available
before firing. The transition then determines which configuration is being tested based
on the attributes of the divisions. The transition finally assesses the delay based on the
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Figure 3.8

Simplified MITRE Decomposition
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number of missed requirements and configuration. Figure 3.9 shows the implementation
of the time delay rule for A11, Analyze Mission.

Figure 3.9

Example Implementation of a Rule

In order to fully understand how the timing rules were implemented, the Analyze
Mission transition will be examined. In Figure 3.9, it can be seen that three divisions are
required to activate the transition based on the three arc inscriptions between the transition
and the Organizational Resources place, located in the bottom right of the figure. There
are five available tokens in the Organizational Resources place, one for each division. The
attributes of each token include the division name and location. All divisions are forward
deployed except for the AMD, so this picture is taken from configuration two. The time
delay logic is shown in the lower left hand corner of Figure 3.9. The delay logic uses
nested if statements to determine the configuration and then assign the appropriate delay.
It should be noted that each rule must be specifically coded for each transition, which
makes implementing conditional MOEs very time consuming for large CPNs.
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Additional rules were developed to ensure the flow of the CPN was correct, but
were not necessary to implement in the CPN because of the linear process. It is possible
for guard functions to be needed to ensure the proper flow in nonlinear CPNs. All of the
rules, including rules governing process flow, have been included in Appendix II.
3.3.3

State Transition Diagram (OV-6b).

The state transition diagram is used

to verify that the CPN passes through all expected states. State transition diagrams can
be developed at various levels of abstraction, and we modeled them corresponding to the
A0 level decomposition of the OV-5. The State Transition Diagram for the Air Tasking
Cycle is shown in Figure 3.10. This is verified as the CPN passes through the states in
the proper sequential order. The state transition diagrams for nonlinear systems would be
more difficult to use in verifying the functionality of a CPN.

Figure 3.10

3.3.4

Air Tasking Cycle State Transition Diagram

Logical Data Model (OV-7).

The OV-7 was developed in the course of our

research. We see the creation of a validated OV-7 as the key remaining task in completing
the MITRE architecture.
Fortunately, most of the data we needed was obtained from the data dictionary.
There are many comments for the existing products that spell out the generics of the
system information. For example, the OV-5 ICOM between A1.1 and A1.2 is “Mission
Analysis.” The data dictionary description for this ICOM is “An analysis of: Theater
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Commander/JFC mission and intent; NCA/Theater Commander/JFC determined end
state; existing plans; applicable joint, multinational and Service doctrine; treaties, policies,
legal restrictions, and ROE; JFACC guidance or direction; and command relationships.”
From this we were able to create the OV-7 entity “Mission Analysis” and fill in its
attributes as shown in figure 3.11. Since our purpose was to create the CPN model, only
attributes that we decided would be modeled needed to be included in the OV-7. If multiple
attributes always followed the same path in the CPN, we could combine them to simplify
the model and add readability. These attributes are modeled as strings instead of data
because that is how they are passed in the model.

Figure 3.11

3.4

OV-7 Developed for Colored Petri Net

Executable Architecture Development
CPN Tools was selected as the CPN software of choice due to its legacy of being

the most widely used CPN software program. The preceding version of CPN Tools was
called Design/CPN and was only to be run in a Linux/Unix environment. CPN Tools
was developed to be more user friendly and compatible with Windows. With this major
revision, the majority of the built in analytic features were lost. For example, Design/CPN
had integrated tools for doing statistical analysis and creating graphical output. CPN
Tools has the ability to generate simulation reports and state space reports. A simulation
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report contains all of the bindings of variables and the corresponding time stamp. This
information is sufficient if care was taken in selecting and incorporating MOEs.
There were two reasons for adding a second executable architecture. The most
obvious reason is to compensate for some analytical shortcomings of CPN Tools. Arena
has the ability to generate a simulation report with many statistical results included
automatically. Another key feature of is the utilization of a tool called Process Analyzer.
This allows multiple configurations to be predefined and run for a set number of
replications. The results then are displayed for all configurations for easy comparisons.
This capability will be further explained in Section 3.5. The second reason an executable
architecture was pursued in Arena is to enable a tool comparison. CPNs are the only model
that has been suggested for use in developing models from DoDAF products. Although
CPNs provide a crisp and clean implementation from DoDAF sources, the suitability of
another model was desired for comparison.
3.4.1

CPN Development.

The same process that was discussed in Section 2.4.2

was used to develop the CPN. The only additional concept is the place for organizational resources. The involvement of the five divisions has been shown on the OV-5 as
mechanisms. The five divisions were implemented as tokens and located in a single place
for organizational resources. Each token corresponding to a division had an attribute for
the division name and the location. Location was an enumerated color set that could be
either deployed, reachback, or remote. The difference between remote and reachback is
that two reachback divisions are considered collocated. This would not be true if two
divisions were remote, in which they would be at two geographically separated locations.
This nuance is intended to allow more configurations to be developed and implemented in
the future. The CPN will be presented in a top down manner, similar to the decomposition
of the Operational Activity Model beginning at the A-0 level. The top level of the CPN is
shown in Figure 3.12.
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Figure 3.12

Top Level View of the CPN

The elegant one-to-one mapping of the structure of the CPN to the A-0 view of the
OV-5 can easily be seen on this high level view. IDEF0 inputs become places feeding
into the transitions and the IDEF0 output become places leaving the transition. The
IDEF0 activity becomes the transition. This mapping provides an unambiguous method
for developing an executable architecture. Figure 3.13 shows the air tasking cycle at the
first level of decomposition.
There are six transitions on the A0 page. These transitions correspond directly to
the six step process of the air tasking cycle as described in chapter two as well as the
A1 level of decomposition of the OV-5. It is important to be aware of what transition or
transitions are “primed”. These are the transitions that have the necessary tokens in all of
incoming places. CPN Tools highlights the transitions that are primed. If the transition
is decomposed and a transition on the decomposed page is primed, CPN Tools highlights
the tag on the parent transition. This can be seen in Figure 3.13 by the highlighting around
the A1 tag at the bottom left of the first transition. This transition has been decomposed in
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Figure 3.13

A0 View of the CPN

Figure 3.14. From this level decomposition it can be seen that the entire A11 transition is
highlighted.
This is the lowest level of decomposition. This level was selected because it allows
the air tasking cycle to be adequately represented without implying any restriction on how
the operational activities are performed. The A2 transition is decomposed in Figure 3.15.
There are two methods of developing a CPN using CPN Tools. This is by using
either a top-down or bottom-up approach. There are advantages of using a top-down
approach.

If a transition is selected to be decomposed, CPN Tools will place the

adjacent places on the decomposition page. This helps to ensure coherency throughout
the decomposition. CPN Tools also assigns the appropriate port type on both pages. For
example, the Organizational Resources place requires tokens to pass in both directions.
This requires that the port on the organizational resources place on the decomposed to be
assigned as Input/Output capable. By following the top down approach, these nuances are
automatically managed. The A3 transition is decomposed in Figure 3.16.
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Figure 3.14

A1 View of the CPN

As transitions are decomposed it is important to keep track of what each page
represents. The page numbers within the CPN model have been labeled with the same
syntax that is used for activity decompositions in an OV-5. For example the page shown
in Figure 3.16 would be labeled A3. The A31 and A32 transitions have been decomposed
in Figures 3.17 and 3.18.
On all of the arcs between the organizational resources and any adjacent transition
there appears to be only one arc. This is because all of the arcs are stacked. Then
inscriptions for each arc can be seen to verify the number of arcs. In general, only one
token can be passed on an arc when a transition fires. This is because the syntax in CPN
Tools requires unique variables to be assigned for each token attribute. This enables all of
the attributes of any token to be used in implementing rules within a transition. The last
transition, A4, is decomposed in Figure 3.19.
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Figure 3.15

A2 View of the CPN

Figure 3.16

A3 View of the CPN
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Figure 3.17
3.4.2

Arena Development.

A31 View of the CPN
After completing the development of the Colored

Petri Net representing the ATO production thread, we found CPN Tool’s simulation
capabilities to be somewhat lacking. In an effort to conduct a more thorough simulation
analysis, a parallel model was developed in Arena, whose purpose was to mirror the
execution of the Petri Net. This was a relatively simple modeling exercise given that
the Petri Net provided the blueprint for the Arena model.
We began by defining the entities for the Arena implementation of the Petri Net.
Each of the tokens from the Petri Net was mapped to an entity type within Arena, with the
exception of the five tokens representing the five divisions involved in ATO production.
Those assets were modeled as resources in the Arena model, as they are the scarce
resources that perform activities involved in the production of the ATO. This modeling
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Figure 3.18

A32 View of the CPN

approach resulted in a larger number of entities than is usually present in an Arena model.
Their handling was fairly simple however, as we utilized hold modules to hold the entities
and remove modules to pull them from the queue at the appropriate time.
Next, the transitions associated with the Petri Net were modeled as Arena process
blocks. This allowed us to associate the seizure of the resources representing the divisions
at the appropriate time, and to hold them for an amount of time equal to the time delay
associated with the Petri Net transition. Places in the Petri Net were not directly modeled
in the Arena model. In the instances where a place had multiple transitions, entities
(tokens) were batched and split, and decision blocks were used to direct entities along
each of the paths representing the transitions.
Finally, a second flow was modeled in much the same manner as the “Phantom Bus
Rider” construct in our earlier Arena example. This flow created a “Day” entity every 24
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Figure 3.19

A4 View of the CPN

hours. When this entity was created, it signaled for the release of the primary guidance
documents which start the ATO production cycle. In addition, each day entity also causes
value of a global variable which tracks the current day to be incremented. This value can
then be assigned to each token entity as a “day created” attribute. The various batch blocks
within the model can then be directed to batch only entities that were created on the same
day. Although simulation runs for this thesis modeled only a single execution of the ATO
cycle, this construct should allow for multiple cycles to be run simultaneously.
The final Arena model consisted of 329 blocks. A model of this size cannot easily
be visualized on a single page. Arena allows blocks to be grouped together to form submodels, which is akin to the hierarchical structure Petri Nets allow. Again, the blueprint
provided by the Petri Net provided a natural set of sub-models. The top-level view of the
resulting Arena model is shown in Figure 3.20.
One “day” entity is created every 24 hours, and is then counted. As mentioned
above, this count is assigned as an attribute to all the entities representing Petri Net tokens,
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Figure 3.20

Top Level View of the Arena Implementation of the CPN

so that only those entities created on the same day can be batched together. The “Assign
Configuration” block sets the parameters for the delay distributions, and assigns an overall
configuration (i.e. all divisions collocated, AMD division reach back, etc.) to be modeled.
This block is used in conjunction with the Arena Process Analyzer to rapidly run multiple
configurations without having to manually change parameters between replications. The
“Release Guidance” block sends a signal to the hold modules in the “Create Initial
Guidance” sub-model. This releases the four tokens from their hold modules and begins
the flow of information through the model. Figure 3.21 shows the Arena model built to
accomplish this.
The remaining sub-models, which seek to mirror the functionality of the Petri Net,
are considerably more complex. Each follows the same basic strategy in that entities
representing all the tokens required by the sub-model are created and held at the start
of model execution. This results in each sub-model containing a number of structures
like those shown in Figure 3.22. In this example, which is a portion of the “Coordinate
Strategy” sub-model, seven create blocks each create the tokens needed for the sub3-23

Figure 3.21

Creation of Arena Entities to Model CPN Tokens

model’s execution. These entities are then available to be removed from their respective
hold blocks at the appropriate time in the execution of the sub-model.
The entry of entities into a sub-model is analogous to tokens in the Petri Net arriving
at the appropriate place to enable the firing of a transition. In the case of the “Coordinate
Strategy” sub-model, this involves the four initial planning documents arriving. Figure
3.23, which represents the remainder of the “Coordinate Strategy” sub-model, shows
this via the batch block labeled “Analysis Requirements”. This batch block combines
the four initial guidance documents into one entity which can then trigger the start of
the “Analyze Mission” process. In our Petri Net once these tokens were in place, along
with the tokens representing the necessary organizational resources, to allow the Analyze
Mission transition to fire, the associated time delay would elapse and then the Mission
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Figure 3.22

Token Creation for the Coordinate Strategy Process

Analysis token would be created. In our Arena implementation, the “Analyze Mission”
process seizes the appropriate resources for a certain amount of time, then frees them
and allows the batched entity representing the guidance documents to continue. This
entity enters the “Remove Mission Analysis” block which removes an entity from the
“Hold Mission Analysis” block. This is analogous to the Petri Net creating the Mission
Analysis token. The Mission Analysis entity then proceeds to the “Determine Aerospace
Objectives” process. The batched entity which represented the initial guidance documents
is no longer required, and thus is separated back into its component entities and disposed
of. This process repeats throughout the remaining processes within the sub-model. Finally,
at the conclusion of the “Obtain Approval of Draft JAOP” process, an entity representing
the approved JAOP is removed and passed out of the “Coordinate Strategy” sub-model
and into the “Develop Targets” sub-model.

3-25

Figure 3.23

Arena Model of the Coordinate Strategy Process

The “Develop Targets” sub-model operates in much the same fashion as the
“Coordinate Strategy” sub-model with one notable exception. Within the “Develop
Targets” sub-model there are three instances in which the corresponding Petri Net places
had multiple outgoing transitions. In order to model these in Arena, we used batched
entities to represent the tokens and decide blocks to control their flow. A portion of the
sub-model is displayed in Figure 3.24.
Here we once again see the structure whereby entities representing tokens are
removed from hold modules, held for a certain delay, passed on to trigger the removal
of the next entity, and then disposed of. What is new is the inclusion of separate and
decide blocks to allow multiple exit paths from the processes. In order to achieve this, the
requisite entities were created in pairs and batched prior to entering their hold modules.
Upon their removal, they enter separate blocks, such as the one labeled “Split AOD
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Figure 3.24

Arena Model of the Develop Targets Process

copies”. They then enter a decide block which counts the number of entities that have
gone down each path and makes sure that they are evenly distributed between the two. In
the case of the AOD entity, one copy continues to the “Develop Targets into a JIPTL”
block, while the other exits the sub-model and enters the first block of the “Develop
Weaponeering and Allocation” sub-model. This captures the Petri Net construct where
the place “AOD” has two outgoing transitions.
This methodology is pursued through the remaining sub-models. Finally, at the
end of the “Produce and Disseminate ATO” sub-model, a decide block is encountered
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with each path leading to an array of delay blocks. Up to this point, the behavior of our
model has been completely deterministic. The amounts of time resources are seized and
tokens are delayed within each of the process blocks have been fixed at the doctrinally
determined nominal time. Lacking any real-world data on exact process performance, this
standard was adopted in order to ensure some degree of validity. The drawback is that
although the model has captured the flow of the ATO production thread, its behavior is
completely deterministic up to this point. This is a divergence from the Petri Net model,
which employed stochastic delays in the transitions. As will be described below, however,
the overall functionality remains the same.
If one wanted to mimic the structure of the Petri Net in its treatment of delays, each
of the connections between processes could be supplemented with a decide block with four
exits, one for each of the configurations modeled. These exits would lead to a single delay
block which held the entity for an amount of time drawn from the appropriate distribution.
If the intent of the model were to simulate multiple, simultaneous ATO cycles this would
be the best way to incorporate delays at the appropriate time in the model’s execution.
In the case of our model, however, our intended use was much simpler: the modeling
of a single ATO production cycle. At the level of abstraction we had chosen, we knew this
to be a completely linear process with no competition for resources or other form of statedependent delay. Thus, the point in the model execution at which a delay occurred had
no bearing on the overall completion time of the ATO, only the value drawn for the delay
mattered. This allowed us to simplify our model considerably by using a single decide
block near the end of the model flow. Rather than having the various stochastic delays
distributed throughout the model, they were grouped into a series of delays served by a
single decide block. Our analysis of the Petri Net showed us exactly how many delays
were associated with each of the four configurations, and so a long chain of delay blocks
could be placed just prior to the disposal of the ATO entity and capture the same net effect
as if they had been scattered along the transitions throughout the model.
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Figure 3.25 shows the beginning of this delay chain. Following the decide block,
which directs the ATO down one of four paths based on the value of the “configuration”
global variable, an assign blocks generates 21 appropriate random draws and assigns them
to attributes of the ATO entity. Each of the ensuing delay blocks then holds the entity
for the amount of time specified in the appropriate attribute. The net effect is that the
ATO’s release time is 72 hours plus the sum of the randomly drawn delays. By having
all configurations operate from the common 72 hour baseline, we see the net difference
generated by their varying number of missed communication requirements. Of course,
this behavior could easily be captured analytically without the use of a simulation model
at all. By developing the basic process in an Arena model however, it is our intent to form
a basis which can be built upon in later research aimed at capturing the concurrent nature
of the true ATO process at a lower level of abstraction. This concept will be more fully
explored in Chapter Five.

Figure 3.25

Process Delays in the Arena Model
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3.5

Executable Architecture Utilization
The executable architectures were used to quantify the impact of the missed

communication requirements. The CPN incorporated the rules that governed which distributions to use in each transitions. The same distributions were used in Arena. This
captures the time penalty for missing at least one of the communication requirements
pertaining to complexity, security, reliability, and speed. There are other aspects of the
air tasking cycle that will be impacted by split operations and potentially cause further
delays. The utilization of the executable models will be limited to addressing the impact
of the communication requirements in Section 2.2. The process analyzer in Arena will
be used to perform a sensitivity analysis of the distributions. This is important because
the range or type of the distribution can not be verified without extensive research of AOC
operations and the sources and durations of actual delays. In lieu of the inability to validate
the distribution, the range of each distribution can be modified in order to find the critical
ranges where the configurations are no longer statically different.
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IV. Results
4.1

Communication Requirements Assessment
The earlier AFIT student group forerunning our research focused their research

on the importance of grounding and effects of communication media.

[16] Their

research was concerned with information passing through four different domains: physical
to information to cognitive, information to information, cognitive to information to
information to cognitive, and cognitive to cognitive. [16, 35] Depending on the modality,
different communication medium are acceptable to transmit the information.

The

communication mediums discussed were face-to-face, video teleconference, telephone,
chat room, email, and bulletin boards.
There are 51 key processes that were also identified in the preceding research. These
51 processes were traced back to the OV-5 activities where the process is taking place.
Since some of these processes are at higher levels of abstraction, some processes apply
to multiple low level OV-5 activities. It is also true that more than process can apply to
any given transition. This provided a mapping between the theoretical implications of
communication theory discussed in Section 2.2 to the executable architecture of the air
tasking cycle. This mapping enabled assessments to be made to determine the impact of
communication media on split AOC operations.
From the four communication paths, characteristics of information were assessed.
The characteristics selected for this study included complexity, security, speed, and
reliability. These characteristics relate directly to the information that is passed throughout
the air tasking cycle. The communication mediums previously mentioned have threshold
levels for each characteristic, limiting the level of information that they are able to
transmit.

This provided a quantifiable way to assess the impact of communication

requirements. When two divisions are not collocated, there is no possibility of faceto-face (F-T-F) communication. F-T-F communication contains the highest values for
all characteristics in consideration as seen in Section 2.2. When F-T-F communication
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is unavailable, the flow of information is dependent on other electronic communication
methods. These other communication methods may not be sufficient to meet all of the
requirements. The results have been consolidated in Table 4.1. This chart shows who is
communicating and how many requirements where missed due to reliability or speed. Not
all missed requirements apply to all configurations. The last four columns indicate what
configurations did not meet the requirement for the transitions listed.
Seven of the 51 processes contained missed requirements. These seven processes
impacted 21 of the 31 lowest level OV-5 activities for configurations 2 and 4 while
impacting 20 activities for the remaining two configurations. This demonstrates how
requirements that are at a higher level of abstraction can impact multiple low level
activities. Only two characteristics were not met: reliability and speed. Reliability was by
far the dominant failure mode with 32 missed requirements. Speed only had 17 missed
requirements. The power of this analysis is that it reveals not only failure modes, but
exposes the number of missed requirements at the lowest level of OV-5 decomposition.
These number of missed requirements are shown in Table 4.2.
Logically, the baseline has the least amount of missed requirements with a total
of 41. This discloses that there are some communication paths used that are not able to
utilize face-to-face communication. These areas provide insight to areas that can be further
examined to improve the current process from the communication modality perspective.
Also it is reasonable that configuration four has the most missed requirements with a total
of 49.
Originally, this analysis was intended to be done using CPN Tools, but as discussed
in Section 3.2 software limitations made this infeasible. With a different CPN software
package which has more flexibility in the code segment, this type of analysis could easily
be implemented. In lieu of this hurdle, the requirement assessment was used as an input
to the executable architectures in order to quantify their temporal impact.
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Table 4.1

4.2

Information Exchange Results

CPN Analysis
Thirty runs were made for each configuration and the time means and 95%

confidence intervals were calculated. These results are shown in Table 4.3. Real numbers
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Table 4.2

Configuration Results

are not allowed in CPN Tools, so integer values for minutes had to be used. Minutes were
chosen as the time units since it would not be logical to have delays in the magnitude of
hours at our level of decomposition. For example, if hours were chosen as the primary
time unit each lowest level activity would be delayed for at least an hour depending on the
distribution range. There are a number of activities that are completed within an hour and
it would not make sense to double or triple the activity time based on evaluating communi-
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cation media. The results will be converted to hours after the model has been verified to
be functioning properly.
Table 4.3

CPN Results (Minutes)

In order to verify the CPN is functioning properly the average ending time and
variance must be checked. The mean time for each configuration for the 30 runs has
been shown in the first column in Table 4.3. These can be verified by creating a 95%
confidence interval about the mean and checking to see if the confidence interval contains
the true mean. In most systems the theoretical mean is not known, but in our system it can
be calculated since the distribution is known that created the random time delays. This
process will be presented for the baseline configuration.
One of the assumptions in Section 3.1 is that the minimum time to produce an
ATO is 72 hours. This is equivalent to 4,320 minutes. The average delay time for a
discrete distribution with a range of one to five minutes is simply three minutes. Using the
configuration results in Table 3.2 as a reference, there are five transitions that missed one
requirement, nine transitions that missed two requirements, and six transitions that missed
three requirements. The following equation is used to determine the average delay:

E[c ∗ g(Y )] = cE[g(Y )]
This equation means that if the average delay is three minutes and is multiplied by
two, in the situation where two requirements where missed, the average delay would be
six minutes. This allowed the theoretical average delay time to be calculated as follows:
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5(transitions with one missed req0t) ∗ 3(average delay) + 9 ∗ 6 + 6 ∗ 9 = 123 minutes

Notations have been added around the first time to explain what the terms represent.
The delay of 123 minutes is added to the static 4320 (72 hour) processing time for a
theoretical value of 4443 minutes. As can be seen in Table 3.3, this is very close to the
sampled mean time of 4442.83 minutes. The theoretical mean for configurations two
through four are 4,664 minutes, 4,696 minutes, and 5,079.5 minutes respectively. All of
these values fall within the 95% confidence intervals that have been calculated in Table
4.3.
In calculating confidence intervals, an assumption must be made that the data is
normal. Even though discrete distributions are being used over a relatively small interval,
the sample space does become normal by adding multiple discrete random variables. This
can be visualized by Figure 4.1. Five minute bins have been constructed for the sampled
data for the baseline configuration. This is the configuration with the least amount of
variability so by illustrating that this data is mound shaped, the other configurations will
also be validated. The distribution of the sample points appears to follow the bell-shaped
pattern of a normal distribution. Also, with 30 sample points, the central limit theorem
can be invoked. This allows the assumption of normality to be made regardless of the
distribution of the population from which the sample is taken.
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Figure 4.1

Configuration One Distribution

The last thing that needs to be checked to verify that the results of CPN Tools are
within expectations is the variance of the sampled data. Once again, since the originating
distributions are known, the theoretical variance of the system can be found. The formula
for variance is shown below:

Variance = σ 2 = E(Y 2 ) − µ 2
where µ is the mean
E(Y 2 ) = ∑ y2 p(y)
y

where y is the sampled value and p(y) is the probability
The mean of a discrete distribution with a range from one to five is already known
to be three. The expected value of y2 is simply: ∑5y=1 y2 p(y). In our case, this yields an
expected value for y2 of 11. The variance of a discrete distribution with a range from one
to five is two. One more equation is needed in order to find the variance of the situations
where a constant is multiplied by a random probability function.
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Var(cX) = E(cY − E(cY ))2 = c2 E(Y − E(Y ))2 = c2Var(X)[14, 14]

This equation proves that the variance is changed by the square of the constant.
Using this equation, in the case where there are two missed requirements, the variance
would be multiplied by two squared, or four. This allows the variance to be calculated for
each transition. Since the variance is an additive property, the sum of the variances would
be the variance of the system. The variance of the baseline has been found to be 190. The
variance of the remaining three configurations are 1848, 2557, and 10563, respectively.
Now that the theoretical variances are known as well as the sampled variances, 95%
confidence intervals can be constructed around the sampled variances to determine if they
contain the theoretical variances. The formula used to calculate the confidence intervals
for the sampled variances is shown below. [28, 408]
(n − 1)S2 (n − 1)S2
, 2
2
Xα/2
X1−α/2

!

where: n is the number of sample points,
S is the sample variance,
α is the selected confidence level,
and X 2 is the appropriate chi-square statistic
The results of the confidence intervals are shown in Table 4.4. All of the confidence
intervals hook the theoretical variance, except for configuration four. The fourth configuration has the largest theoretical variance of all of the configurations. This also would
imply that the population (ie, possible outcomes of time delays) of the fourth configuration
is significantly larger than the other three configurations. With only thirty sampled points
it is very likely to not select extreme data points. The theoretical variance is calculated
based upon the complete population, including the unlikely extreme data points. This
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explains the trend for the theoretical variance being higher than the observed variance.
Since the same model was used for all four configurations and only configuration four did
not capture the theoretical mean, the assumption that the model is behaving properly will
be made.
Table 4.4

95% Variance Confidence Intervals

Now that the CPN has been demonstrated to be performing as expected the results
will be further analyzed. Table 4.5 converts the results to hours. The confidence interval is
still 95%. It is important to verify the model before converting to hours because constants
have a nonlinear impact on variance. By converting to hours by dividing by a constant
would make checking the theoretical variance more complicated.
Table 4.5

CPN Results (Hours)

The same confidence intervals that were calculated around the sample means can
be used to determine if the configurations are significantly different. If the confidence
intervals overlap for any two configurations, those configurations can be viewed as the
same from a statistical perspective. As can be seen from Table 4.5, all the configurations are significantly different, although configurations two and three are very close
to overlapping. They are close because they use the same distribution (discrete from 1
to 15) and are different because configuration three has four more missed requirements.
Arena was used to find at what points configurations that do not use the same distribution
become statistically the same. These are the critical points of the distribution.
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4.3

Arena Analysis
4.3.1

Ensuring Model Equivalence.

We began by performing a similar analysis

to that described above to first verify that our Arena model was indeed mirroring the
performance of the Petri Net. Since the models use different underlying random number
generators, results of identical configurations could be expected to differ. The overall
behavior of the models could be expected to agree however, particularly regarding their
proximity to the theoretical mean and variance. Thirty replications were used in the Arena
model as well to ensure sample size was not a cause for discrepancies. As shown in Table
4.6 below, the 95% confidence interval which Arena constructs automatically captured
the theoretical mean for all four configurations. Applying the same method as above to
construct confidence intervals around the variance calculations, we found that again the
95% confidence interval captured the theoretical value in all but the fourth configuration.
The results are summarized in Table XX below.
To further compare the performance of the two models and ensure their performance
was not statistically different, we formed a 95% confidence interval around the difference
in their means. To ensure our accuracy we employed both a traditional Paired-t test and a
Modified Two-Sample-t test which Law and Kelton attribute to Welch. [11, 557-559]
4.3.1.1

Traditional Paired-t Test.

Configuration One’s results were

selected for both the CPN and Arena models. This configuration was used in a traditional
paired-t test as well as a modified two sample-t test. For the traditional paired-t test, we
begin by defining ζ = µ1 − µ2 where µ1 is the expected ATO cycle produced by the Arena
model and µ2 is the corresponding response from the Petri Net in the baseline configuration. We then pair the observations for ATO cycle time, with X1 j representing the j (in
this case 30) values realized by the Arena model and X2 j representing the values realized
by the Petri Net. This allows us to form 30 values for a new variable Z j = X1 j − X2 j
for j = 1, 2, . . . , n. This new variable is now Independent and Identically Distributed and
E[Z] = ζ . A confidence interval for ζ can then be formed by letting
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Z(n) =

∑nj=1 Z j
n

and

d
=
Var[Z(n)]

∑nj=1 [Z j − Z(n)]2
n(n − 1)

and form the confidence interval
q
d
Z(n) ± tn−1,1− α Var[Z(n)]
2

Applying this process to the data generated by the two models results in a 95%
confidence interval, in minutes, of

−4.62 ± 36.596 = [−41.2, 31.97]
Since this interval covers 0 we can conclude at the α = 0.05 level that there is insufficient
evidence to say that these two models are significantly different.
The paired-t test is best employed in situations where the simulation experiment has
been designed such that there is some degree of correlation between the output of the two
models. The use of common random numbers (CRN), in which the same random number
streams are used in both models, is a common method of achieving this. This results in a
reduction in the size of Var(Z j ) and thus in the width of the confidence interval.
4.3.1.2

Modified Two-Sample-t Test.

Since our two configurations were

being modeled on two different simulation platforms, it was not possible to construct a
CRN experiment. Thus, as a final check of the equivalence between the two models, we
performed a modified two-sample-t test. The traditional two-sample-t test requires that
the variance of the two samples be the same, or the validity of the calculated confidence
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interval suffers. Since we were using two different simulation platforms with two different
random number generators, a far safer assumption is that the population’s variances are
not equal. The modified test does require independence between the data sets, but the use
of two simulation platforms makes this a safe assumption.
The modified test begins in the usual manner by defining
n

i
Xi j
∑ j=1
X i (ni ) =
ni

and
n

i
[Xi j − Xi (ni )]2
∑ j=1
ni − 1

Si2 (ni ) =

for i = 1, 2. We then compute the estimated degrees of freedom

fˆ =

[

S12 (n1 )
n1

2
[S12 (n1 )]
n1

(n1 −1)

S22 (n2 ) 2
n2 ]

+
+

2
[S22 (n2 )]
n2
(n2 −1)

and form a confidence interval
s
X 1 (n1 ) − X 2 (n2 ) ± t fˆ,1− α
2

S12 (n1 ) S22 (n2 )
+
n1
n2

as an approximate 100(1 − α) percent confidence interval for ζ . As expected, this
yielded a non-integer value for fˆ so it was necessary to use MatLab in order to calculate
the appropriate t value. This ultimately led to a 95% confidence interval on the difference
in the means of

−4.62 ± 34.067 = [−38.69, 29.44]
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This so-called Welch confidence interval [11, 559] again covers 0 so we again conclude
that at the α = 0.05 level there is insufficient evidence to say that these two models are
significantly different.
4.3.2

Arena Results.

At this point we were very confident that our Arena model

was accurately mirroring the performance of our Petri Net for all configurations. This
allowed us to utilize the Arena Process Analyzer (PAN) to rapidly test multiple parameter
settings across the configurations. One of the weakest points in our model of the ATO
development thread, we felt, was the discrete distributions used to determine the delays
associated with missed communication requirements. The ranges were chosen because
they seemed reasonable, making them one of the only elements of the model not directly
traceable to an element of the validated architecture. While we knew that we could not
validate these parameter settings, we felt it might provide some insight to investigate the
impacts of varying their values.
Figure 4.2 below shows the nine scenarios PAN was configured to execute. The
controls to be modified were the maximum values of the delay distributions. Values
ranging from the baseline of 15 to a maximum of 30 were defined in increments of five for
both configuration two and three. Configuration four was run in its baseline configuration
with a maximum delay of 30. Of interest was whether any of these configurations would
result in overlapping confidence intervals for the predicted mean ATO cycle time.
Table 4.6 displays the numerical results of the PAN runs, while Figure 4.3 presents
the data graphically. As Figure 4.3 makes clear, there was only one overlap in the 95%
confidence intervals on the predicted mean ATO cycle time. Configuration three, in which
the Combat Plans and Strategy Divisions are at reachback locations overlaps with configuration four, which further distributes the Air Mobility Division. This overlap occurs only
when configuration three’s maximum delay is increased to 30 minutes, which was the
highest value tested.
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Figure 4.2

Table 4.6

PAN Scenario Definition

95% Confidence Intervals on Mean ATO Cycle Time
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Figure 4.3

PAN Confidence Intervals on Predicted Mean ATO Cycle Time
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V. Conclusions and Recommendations
5.1

Conclusions
5.1.1

Significance of Executable Architectures.

The process of utilizing

DoD Architecture Framework (DoDAF) views as the foundation to build an executable
architecture provided many insights to the analysis of distributed air operations. A
common executable architecture was simulated in CPN Tools and Arena. While each
of these tools provided distinctly different capabilities and limitations, the foundation was
the structure produced in the static DoDAF design.
5.1.1.1

CPN Implementation.

The primary strength of CPNs is that it

provides a distinct and undeniable ability to trace each component of the Colored Petri
Net back to a DoDAF product. This traceability is ideal for validating and creating a
pedigree for an executable model. The relationship between the executable architecture
and originating DoDAF products is so strong that a properly constructed CPN could be
used to create a complete OV-5, OV-6a, and all of the entities of the OV-7. This linkage
enables anyone with a working knowledge of DoDAF to easily create and read CPNs.
CPN Tools was found to be extremely limited in the ability to do analysis. This is
due to software limitations within CPN Tools. The methodology of employing CPNs is
substantially more powerful than the implementation within CPN Tools. Other tools have
been researched and also come with their own unique limitations.
There were three obvious tool limitations within CPN Tools. These were the ability
to generate batch runs, overly constricted code segments on transitions, and the prohibition
of real numbers. The ability to create batch files with varied inputs would allow higher
methods of analysis such as a design of experiments or sensitivity analysis to be used. This
would be a great compliment to the current features of being able to generate a simulation
and state space report. The limitation that was encountered with the code segment was
the limit of a single “IF-THEN-ELSE” construct. “IF” statements can be nested, but this
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requires that all possibilities be enumerated. For example, if it is desired to check to see
if three tokens have the same location, seven nested if statements would be required. This
could be simplified by allowing more than one if statement within a code segment. The
biggest tool limitation is the prohibiting of real numbers. This was a feature that was lost
when converting from the older version Design/CPN to the latest version of CPN Tools.
This prohibits any random distributions to be used that are not discrete as well as severely
impacting the ability to use mathematical equations to modify and assess MOEs.
5.1.1.2

Arena Implementation.

As mentioned above, CPN Tools

presents some limitations in its ability to run a simulation experiment involving multiple
replications and the resulting statistics. CPN Tools predecessor, Design/CPN, possessed
a more robust simulation engine which allowed multiple replications to run in a batch
mode and automatically gathered multiple statistics across the replications. Unfortunately,
Design/CPN is no longer supported and does not allow hierarchical nets. These were two
of the primary considerations behind our decision to use CPN Tools.
In order to supplement CPN Tools simulation capabilities, a parallel model was
developed in Arena. As described in Section 3.4.2 this was a large, and somewhat
cumbersome model. Arena’s intended purpose as a modeling tool for business or manufacturing processes does not immediately lend itself to the logical constructs of a Petri Net.
This resulted in the large number of unique entities that were developed to mirror the Petri
Net tokens.
An Arena model developed from scratch to model the ATO production thread would
likely have been very different. It likely would not have displayed the traceability back
to DoDAF products that the Petri Net displayed. The process of mirroring the Petri Net
once it was developed however was relatively straightforward. The Petri Net provided the
blueprint as detailed in Section 3.4.2. Although the resulting net lacked the “elegance” of
the Petri Net, it was developed rapidly and easily captured the same performance.
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Once developed, multiple replications of a variety of configurations could be run
in a batch mode with the Arena Process Analyzer. Relevant statistics were gathered and
95% confidence intervals were generated automatically. Equivalent processing using CPN
Tools would have been a very lengthy process involving manual intervention between the
runs of differing configurations. This was the real strength of the Arena model and the
primary reason we chose to construct it.
5.1.2

Interpretation of Numerical Results.

As mentioned in Chapter 4 we began

by comparing each model individually to the theoretical values we should expect to see.
Once this was done, we then compared the two models to one another to ensure that their
performance was equivalent. We observed behavior from both models consistent with
the theoretical values and found that a 95% confidence interval on the difference between
their means covered zero. This led us to conclude that the models were both performing
properly on their own and in comparison to one another.
We then turned to comparing the original four configurations. The most obvious
observation was that the 95% confidence intervals for the predicted ATO cycle time did
not overlap with any of our four configurations. This was to be expected, though we did
think that configurations two and three were similar enough that an overlap might have
been possible, since they both drew from a discrete distribution with the same bounds.
After running PAN to compare a variety of configurations we found that the only
overlap in confidence intervals occurred between configurations three and four when
configuration three’s maximum bound was increased to 30 minutes.

From this we

concluded that the various configurations are not overly sensitive to small changes in
the bounds of the discrete distributions. The fact that configuration three’s maximum
bound had to be doubled before an overlap was observed supported this conclusion. This
condition also represented a violation of assumption four from Section 3.1.2, namely that
the number of communicating nodes will impact the range of the delay distribution. In
this case the overlap did not occur until configuration three’s maximum was increased to
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30 which is the same value as configuration four’s maximum. Since configuration four
represents communication between one more node than configuration three, this is not
consistent with our assumptions.
The behavior of the 95% confidence intervals as the distribution bounds were
increased also supported the use of our simulations as a comparitive tool. Due to the fact
that we were unable to validate the bounds of the distributions used to determine delay
values, neither the CPN or Arena model may be used to predict absolute performance
of a configuration. However, since their behavior remains statistically different within
the bounds of our assumptions, their relative performance as measured by either tool is a
useful comparative value.
The results of our analysis produced a rank ordered list of the configurations. This
list is shown in Table 5.1. The list is ordered from the best, or lowest mean time to produce
the ATO, to the worst. Coincidently, the order that the configurations were numbered
is the same as their ranking. The CPN mean times have also been shown to provide a
quantifiable measure of the differences. The driving factor of our model was the distribution range. This can be deducted by the overlap in the confidence intervals that was
discovered between configurations three and four. Even though configuration four had
two additional missed requirements than configuration three, they were found to be statistically the same when they used the same distribution range of one to thirty minutes.

Rank
1
2
3
4

5.1.3

Table 5.1 Ranked Configurations
Configuration CPN Mean Time (Hrs)
One
74.05
Two
77.61
Three
78.26
Four
84.83

Lessons Learned.

Throughout the course of this project, many things

were learned pertaining to developing and assessing executable architectures. Early in the
process it is essential to have the problem well defined and the measures of effectiveness
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selected. Executable architectures can be utilized to analyze many different attributes.
Different attributes will affect how the rules are developed and implemented. Significant
time will be lost by not having a well defined problem, direction, and goal, as well as a
firm method of measuring progress toward that goal.
An important aspect of the problem definition and MOE selection process is
ensuring a methodology is in place for capturing the relevant information. Throughout this
project we grappled with issues such as how to define the quality of an ATO or quantify
the impact of a change in communication media on the quality of the information passed.
Though these are central concepts to evaluating the effectiveness of any AOC configuration, they are difficult to quantify much less predict without executing the processes via
an AOC exercise or some other physical implementation of the architecture. A simulation
is only as good as the data used in its construction, and where that data is un- or ill-defined
the best simulation is little more than an educated guess.
With that said, a simulation can still provide insight into the relevant processes. By
identifying bottlenecks or uncovering other emergent behavior, a model can reveal aspects
of the system that were not apparent in a static analysis. So long as these behaviors
are not strictly a result of inaccurate parameter settings, they provide hitherto unknown
information about the behavior of the system.
It is equally important to learn as much as possible about a software tool before
using it for model development. As previously mentioned, this project used CPN Tools to
develop the executable architecture in a colored petri net. While time was spent to assess
various tools at the onset of the project it was infeasible with the time and manpower
constraints to foresee all potential shortcomings of CPN Tools. In hindsight, Design/CPN
might have provided greater functionality, but had a much greater acquisition time since
it required mailing request forms to Denmark and waiting for the software to be mailed
back and then approved for use through AFIT/SC. While it is speculated that Design/CPN
would provide greater functionality, it should be noted that this is based upon reading
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about the program and not on experience. Design/CPN would undoubtedly come with its
own unexpected limitations.

5.2

Recommendations
The research of this project provides a great springboard for further endeavors in

creating and assessing executable architectures. Most recommendations are specific to
expanding upon the research presented within this thesis and other recommendations are
in general areas that have not been fully explored.
5.2.1

Project Specific Recommendations.

There are a number of assumptions

that were made in order to scope this problem to a size that could be addressed with the
time and manpower available. One of these assumptions was the focus of developing
the ATO, which is a subset of the whole air tasking cycle. Completing this air tasking
cycle would provide a more detailed analysis. The two remaining steps that would need
to be decomposed to complete this cycle are execution and assessment. By incorporating
these two remaining steps new MOEs could be identified that pertain to the execution and
assessment of actual MOEs. These MOEs could impact the development of the next ATO
since the process is a sequential cycle.
Another assumption was to model only one ATO, when in reality there are four
ATOs that are being developed simultaneously. This concurrent development process
should be modeled and examined. This would cause the state space to be “nonlinear”
since it would not be specified in which order the four ATOs would fire. More importantly
it would allow bottlenecks to be identified if random delays are still incorporated. If four
ATOs are modeled and are simulated for multiple cycles, there may be specific steps of the
air tasking cycle that are sources for bottlenecks. This would allow the most constraining
phase of the air tasking cycle to be identified and potentially rearchitected in order to
maximize throughput of ATOs.
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The organizational resources for this model were implemented at the division level.
This high level of abstraction limits split operation flexibility. There may be other configurations that are more suitable for the split operations concept and should be explored.
Modeling resources at the team level with four configurations could also show where
there are resource constraints due to a team being involved with multiple phases of ATO
development. This is especially true for the ISR division. Modeling organizational
resources at the division level also constrained the potential to run simultaneous ATO
cycles. Since the divisions were not decomposed into teams that could be allocated across
different processes at the same time, no parallel processing could take place.
Time was utilized as the MOE to assess communication modality of various AOC
configurations. Pursuing quality as an MOE would provide further insight on how
split operations effect the air tasking cycle. Quality would help assess the value of the
information that passes throughout the air tasking cycle. Since the information is passed
between divisions and throughout the whole air tasking process it would seem logical that
the quality is not an independent attribute. This would mean that a low quality value of one
document would impact any related documents that were subsequently developed. This
residual effect of assessing quality throughout the ATO is intriguing.
5.2.2

General Recommendations.

The tight interdependence between a CPN

and DoDAF products has been displayed in this project as well as many other publications.
With this tight dependency, an automated method could potentially be developed that
describes how CPNs should be used to modify an architecture. There may be more than
one way that a CPN might provide feedback into the static architecture. For example,
valid process flow can be determined by simulating a CPN. The sequential nature of the
activity model could be verified through this simulation. A less obvious feedback could
be through assessing MOEs. If a MOE is carefully selected where it will either pass or
fail at the lowest level activities of the OV-5, it could be used to highlight areas of the
architecture that might need to be reevaluated. This area of utilizing a CPN to provide
feedback to the static architecture is not well defined and should be pursued.
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The coherency between static architecture products and a CPN is ideal for
specifying an automated process for developing an executable architecture. The process
of taking an OV-5, OV-6a, OV-6b, and OV-7 to create an executable architecture has been
well documented. It would be logical to create a tool to automate this process. This
was examined briefly, but had to be abandoned due to time constraints. One interesting
approach was the potential to partially automate the development of CPN models from
a static architecture OV-5. CPN Tools utilizes the extensible markup language (XML)
to save Petri Net models. We briefly explored the potential to extract information on
processes and ICOMs from the OV-5 in a Popkin System Architect database and use this
to populate a skeleton XML file for use in CPN Tools. We determined that it would be
extremely difficult to fully populate the XML file as this requires translation of information
for the placement of Petri Net elements on the screen. It should be relatively straightforward however to automatically perform a consistency check between a CPN XML
file and a static architecture. Such a tool would be a very useful development aid when
building an executable architecture.
The concept of using mechanisms in a CPN was introduced in this project. There
may be other ways to implement mechanisms for analytic purposes. In our study the
attributes of the organizational resources were static throughout the simulation. How
would it impact the system if the organizational resources contained attributes that were
dynamic during the simulation? For example, it is desired to assess the impact of fatigue
of each shift working 12 hours a day. A function could be used to modify a divisions
effectiveness as their shift progresses. This concept of degraded functionality could apply
to any system, biological or not. Future research in this area could broaden the analytical
capabilities of a CPN.

5-8

Appendix A. List of Acronyms
Acronym
AC
ACF
ACO
AE
AECT
AFOTTP
AFWG
ALCT
AMC
AMCT
AMD
AOC
AOD
ARCT
ATO
AUAB
AV
C2
C4ISR
CAOC
C-C
CENTAF
C-I-I-C
CMC
COA
COD
CPCL
CPD
CPN
CRN
DFD
DoD
DoDAF
FTF
ICOM

Table A.1 – List of Acronyms
Description
Audio Conferencing
Analysis, Correlation, and Fusion
Airspace Control Order
Aeromedical Evacuation
Aeromedical Evacuation Coordination Team
Air Force Operational Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
Architecture Framework Working Group
Airlift Control Team
Air Mobility Command
Air Mobility Control Team
Air Mobility Division
Air Operations Center
Air Operations Directive
Air Refueling Control Team
Air Tasking Order
Al-Udeid Air Base
All View
Command and Control
Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence,
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
Combined Aerospace Operations Center
Cognitive to Cognitive
Central Command Air Forces
Cognitive to Information to Information to Cognitive
Computer-Mediated Communications
Course of Action
Combat Operations Division
Component Prioritized Collection List
Combat Plans Division
Colored Petri Net
Common Random Numbers
Data Flow Diagram
Department of Defense
Department of Defense Architecture Framework
Face-to-Face
Input, Control, Output, Mechanism
Continued on next page
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Acronym
IDE
IDEF0
IER
I-I
I/O
IPB
ISR
ISRD
JAOC
JAOP
JFACC
JFC
JIPTL
MAAP
MOE
NCW
OV
PACAF
PAN
PED
P-I-C
RCC
SIDO
SPIN
SV
TACC
TBMCS
TET
TNL
TV
UML
USAF
USAFE
VTC
WS
XML

Table A.1 – continued from previous page
Description
Intermediate Developmental Education
Integrated Definition for Function Modeling 0
Information Exchange Requirement
Information to Information
Input/Output
Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Division
Joint Aerospace Operations Center
Joint Air Operations Plan
Joint Forces Air Component Commander
Joint Forces Commander
Joint Integrated Prioritized Targeting List
Master Air Attack Plan
Measure of Effectiveness
Network Centric Warfare
Operational View
Pacific Air Forces
Process Analyzer
Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination
Physical to Information to Cognitive
Rescue Coordination Center
Senior Intelligence Duty Officer
Special Instruction
Systems View
Tanker/Airlift Control Center
Theater Battle Management Core Systems
Target Effects Team
Target Nomination List
Technical View
Unified Modeling Lanhuage
United States Air Force
United States Air Forces Europe
Video Tele-conference
Weapon System
Extensible Markup Language
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Appendix B. DoDAF Architecture Products
B.1

AV-1
• Architecture Project Identification
– Name: Air Tasking Order Cycle for the Air Force Aerospace Operations
Center Weapon System AN/USQ-163, Falconer Architecture, Block 10.1 (asis)
– Short Name: ATO AOC WS 10.1 Architecture
– Organizations Developing the Architecture: MITRE and AFIT/ENY AOC
Study Thesis Group
– Assumptions: Prior to Block 10, no baseline for the AOC weapon system
existed; individual site organizations created and managed their own AOC’s
according to various local methods and designs. This architecture reflects the
baseline portions of the Al-Udeid Air Base (AUAB) AOC ATO Cycle.
– Constraints: Time, manpower, and no funding.
– Approval Authority: Committee composed of Lt Col John M. Colombi
(Chairman), Dr.

David R. Jacques (Member), and Maj Joerg D. Walter

(Member)
– Date Completed: February 16, 2005
– Level of Effort and Project and Actual Costs to Develop the Architecture:
The development of the architecture defining the air tasking cycle was a
portion of an AFIT Systems Engineering Graduate Thesis. The architecture
was developed by modifying an existing architecture that MITRE produced to
describe the entire AOC. This architecture was scoped for the air tasking cycle,
more specifically the production and dissemination of the ATO. This was an
educational endeavor that was not funded.
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• Scope: Architecture View and Products Identification
– Views and Products Available
∗ (AV-1) Overview and Summary Information
∗ (AV-2) Integrated Dictionary
∗ (OV-1) High Level Operational Concept
∗ (OV-2) Operational Node Connectivity Description
∗ (OV-3) Operational Information Exchange Matrix
∗ (OV-5) Operational Activity Model
∗ (OV-6a) Operational Rules Model
∗ (OV-6b) Operational State Transition Description
∗ (OV-7) Logical Data Model
∗ (SV-1) System Interface Description
∗ (SV-5) Operational Activity to Systems Function Traceability Matrix
∗ (TV-1) Technical Standards Profile
– Time Frames Addressed: This architecture depicts ATO cycle for the AOC WS
Block 10.1 that is implemented currently through FY06.
– Organizations Involved
∗ AFIT/ENY
∗ MITRE, ESC Divisions and Operating Locations (OL)
• Purpose and Viewpoint
– Purpose
The ATO AOC WS Architecture reflects the capabilities required to produce
an ATO. The Purpose of this Architecture is to support the development of an
Executable Architecture for the ATO cycle in current and ”to-be” Architectures
of the AOC WS. The list below details the purpose of this version.
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– From Whose Viewpoint the Architecture is Developed
This viewpoint belong to the AFIT System Engineering Students developing
the Executable Architecture
• Context
– Governing and Source Documents
∗ AFOTTP 2-3.2
∗ AOC Familiarization Course
∗ JP 3-30
• Tools and File Formats Used
MS Word, MS Excel, Popkin’s System Architect were all used in developing the
static architecture. File formats followed the structures laid out in DoDAF Volume
II.
• Findings
– Analysis Results The static architecture was used to develop a CPN to evaluate
the impact of different geographic configurations of the AOC. Time was
selected as the measure of effectiveness assuming that different communication requirements would randomly impact the time delays of each transition.
The complete methodology for this analysis can be found in Chapter Three.
The model proved that having all divisions collocated is optimal from this
focused perspective of analyzing communication requirements. Reference
Chapter Four for the complete discussion of the results.
– Recommendations Recommendations have been made in Section 5.2.
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AV-2
The integrated dictionary was developed by MITRE and accompanied their

architecture views. The AV-2 is available in electronic format, but due to its size it was
infeasible to provide within this appendix. For more information about this view as well as
other MITRE architecture products contact either Mr. Scott Surer or Mr. Ronnie Lesher.
Mr. Scott Surer
The MITRE Corporation
202 Burlington Rd. Mail Stop 1614B
Bedford, MA 01730
Phone: 781-266-9218
Email: surer@mitre.org

Mr. Ronnie Lesher
The MITRE Corporation
MITRE Gateway
Hampton, VA 23666
Phone: 757-896-8571
Email: rlesher@mitre.org
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OV-1

Figure B.1

OV-1 Description
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Figure B.2

Figure B.3

OV-1 Baseline

OV-1 Reachback Configuration
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B.4

OV-2

Figure B.4
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OV-2

B.5

OV-3
Table B.1
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OV-3

Table B.2

OV-3 Continued
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Table B.3

OV-3 Continued
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Table B.4

OV-3 Continued
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Table B.5

OV-3 Continued
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B.6

OV-5

Figure B.5

OV-5 A-0
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Figure B.6

B-14

OV-5 A0

Figure B.7
B-15

OV-5 A1

Figure B.8

B-16

OV-5 A2

Figure B.9
B.7

OV-6a
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OV-5 A3

Figure B.10
B-18

OV-5 A31

Figure B.11

B-19

OV-5 A32

Figure B.12
B-20

OV-5 A4

Table B.6

OV-6a Process Rules
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Table B.7

OV-6a Process Rules Continued
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Table B.8

OV-6a Process Rules Continued

Table B.9

B.8

Time Delay Rules

OV-6b
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Figure B.13
B.9

OV-6b Air Tasking Cycle State Transition Diagram

OV-7

B-24

Figure B.14

OV-7 Entities Corresponding to A1
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Figure B.15

OV-7 Entities Corresponding to A2
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Figure B.16

OV-7 Entities Corresponding to A31

B-27

Figure B.17

OV-7 Entities Corresponding to A32
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Figure B.18

OV-7 Entities Corresponding to A4
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B.10

SV-1

Figure B.19

SV-1 Baseline

B-30

Figure B.20

SV-1 Configuration Two
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Figure B.21

SV-1 Configuration Three
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Figure B.22

SV-1 Configuration Four
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B.11

SV-5

Figure B.23
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SV-5

B.12

TV-1
This is an excerpt from the MITRE technical standards. The complete list of

technical standards is well over 70 pages and does not impact the thrust of the research in
this thesis. As such, the complete list of technical standards will not be shown.
Table B.10

TV-1 Excerpt
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